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ABSTRACT
Three Essays on the Incentive Structure of Energy Conservation Programs
By
Edson Ogochukwu Okwelum
Doctor Philosophy in Environmental and Natural Resource Economics
University of Rhode Island
Professor James Opaluch, Chair
This dissertation is comprised of three related essays examining the potential
effectiveness of government energy efficiency programs from both the producer and
consumer perspectives. The first chapter is based on a paper I coauthored with Corey
Lang. In this manuscript, I address the question of whether strategic behavior by
consumers could result in the erosion of energy savings in a demand response
program. Understanding how the strategic behavior of consumers affects the net
benefits from a demand response program has policy implications because of the
increasing importance that demand response has come to play in utility load and
reliability management during peak times. Using data from a large field experiment in
California in 2007, we test the hypothesis that under a technology program,
consumers‘ strategic behavior results in outcomes that are opposite what is obtainable
under a program with price incentive or based of behavior. Chapter II is also an
empirical study which explores how the preferences of consumers for large and heavy
vehicles imposes costs on society in the form of external costs of accident. This
chapter looks at how fleet changes in weight distribution due to corporate average fuel

economy and consumer demand for heavier vehicles results in fatalities. It is important
to understand how consumer behavior affects the accident rates so that one can obtain
unbiased estimates of accident costs that go into benefit-cost analysis of the impact of
regulations in automobiles. Chapter three addresses how unobserved heterogeneity
and sorting affect the estimates of the consumer willingness to pay for reduction in
future gasoline costs. This tradeoff is important to policy makers and manufactures
because it could help explain why manufacturers fail to adopt technologies for which
the fuel savings far outweigh the costs. The remainder of the abstract provides a more
detailed outlines of the three essays.
Chapter 1 explores strategic behavior by consumers in demand response programs.
The chapter looks at how the confluences of consumer strategic behavior, technology
and price incentives in demand response lead to conflicting outcomes. Demand
response has become an important tool for utilities to manage load during peak
periods. While the effects of demand response programs on peak load reductions are
well studied and intuitive, assessments typically fail to recognize the potential for offpeak behavioral responses that may mitigate the total benefits of the program. Using
smart meter consumption data on residential air conditioning units enrolled in a direct
load control program, this paper examines changes in consumption prior to and after
curtailment events. The manuscript rigorously estimates both peak and off peak
changes in consumption to better understand net benefits of DR programs. We
examine Pacific Gas and Electric‘s (PG&E) SmartAC program, which is designed to
reduce peak cooling load by directly controlling air conditioning units of participants.

Usually, program evaluation uses the availability of a control group to obtain unbiased
estimates of program impacts. However, we do not have the luxury of a control group
in our data. Instead we estimate unit-specific non-linear consumption models and then
compare load on event days to predicted load. Importantly, we use data from the
summer 2007 training period from a stratified random sample of 294 participating AC
units. In contrast to subsequent summers and normal DR designs, during the training
period curtailment days were called for many different temperature levels, not just the
hottest days. This aspect means we are not predicting out of sample, and we can have
greater confidence in our econometric evidence. Our methodology is validated by a
falsification test in which we find no changes in consumption during peak or off-peak
times on non-curtailment days that match the temperature and timing profile of actual
curtailment days.
Several key results emerge from this analysis. First, we confirm that the SmartAC
program, like other DR and DLC programs, reduces peak load during event days. In
this case, peak consumption was reduced 19% on average. However, we also find
substantial increases in consumption in the hours preceding and the hours following an
event by 8% and 7% respectively. Essentially, load is being displaced from peak to
off-peak times. These behavioral changes mitigate the monetary benefits of the
program by 41%.
Chapter II addresses the question of how much accident risks would change if
consumers who purchase larger, heavier vehicles of the existing fleet where to behave
strategically given regulatory constraints imposed by corporate average fuel economy.
The paper estimates both the risk of dying given a crash and the crash frequencies of

different vehicles in the fleet. We use a unique data set that combines data from
fatality analysis reporting system (FARS) and NASS1 General Estimates Systems. The
estimation strategy used corrects for selection bias due to moral hazard problems. The
two equations are estimated simultaneously using simulated maximum likelihood
without the need for exclusion restrictions (Green 2003, 2007). This approach allows
us to obtain estimates that are causal.
One of the main issues that have been left unanswered in earlier works is the existence
of Peltzman-type moral hazard problems and endogeneity of vehicle choice. In the
presence of Peltzman-type moral hazard problems, drivers in heavier vehicles will find
it advantageous to change their behavior in ways that have opposite effect to
regulations. From a public policy perspective if increasing the weight of a vehicle
increases the probability of its being involved in collisions, then we might be
interested in more than the impact of heavier vehicles conditional on a crash
occurring. We find that increasing the weight of any vehicle increases the probability
of it being the heavier vehicle in a collision and the probability of it being involved in
a fatal accident. The external costs translate to about 38 cents/gallon of gasoline.
Chapter III explores how individual unobserved heterogeneity in tastes could lead to
different customers sorting into different classes of fuel efficient vehicles and
therefore affect estimates of consumer‘s ability to tradeoff vehicle costs and
discounted future gasoline costs. The research question is important for several
reasons. First, it is interesting from a theoretical basis if consumers make this trade off
optimally. Many theoretical models in economics make the fundamental assumption
that consumers equally weigh current and future events when making decisions today.
1
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However, plenty empirical and laboratory evidence conclude the contrary. Second,
Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIA) of regulations on energy efficiency standards
usually find that the benefits of these programs are in many times larger than the costs,
with the fuel savings over the life of the vehicle accounting for the majority of the
benefits. However, if fuel savings are large relative to costs, then the question is why
are manufacturers not incorporating these technologies in their product offerings?
Therefore understanding energy paradox is critical for evaluating the standards and
regulations so that policy makers can identify baseline for assessment in cost-benefit
analyses.
In this paper, we contribute to the literature on Energy Paradox in Fuel Economy by
providing empirical evidence that unobserved consumer heterogeneity could result in
different consumers sorting into different classes of fuel efficient cars which results in
consumers undervaluing fuel economy. Unlike existing literature in this topic, this
paper accounts for sorting bias due unobserved heterogeneity by using a random
coefficient logit with error components (Train and Winston 2007). We pair the random
coefficient discrete choice model with a supply side model in which firms compete in
Bertrand Nash fashion where price depends on elasticity of demand and marginal
costs. With the random utility model, we can allow taste to vary across consumers. We
treat the discounted operating costs and vehicle costs as random variables.
We find that a substantial portion of upper the 95% of households in our sample
correctly value fuel economy (61%) as they are willing to pay $0.99 to reduce obtain a
$1.00 discounted future gasoline costs over the lifetime of the vehicle. And 29% of
the upper 95% overvalue fuel economy as they are willing to pay $1.57. These results

are in contrast to those reported elsewhere by Alcott and Wozny (2009) but support
results from the simulation study by Bento et al 2012 who find that not accounting for
sorting bias and consumer heterogeneity could lead to a conclusion that consumers
undervalue fuel economy.
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PREFACE
This dissertation is written in three manuscript form. The first manuscript is based
on a paper I coauthored with Corey Lang and has been submitted to the Energy
Economics Journal for publication.
Manuscript 1: The Mitigating Effect of Strategic Behavior on the Net Benefits of a
Direct Load Control Program
Manuscript 2: Fuel Economy and Vehicle Safety: Selection on Moral Hazard and
Estimates of External Accident Costs
Manuscript 3: Heterogeneity and Sorting in Consumer Valuation of Energy Efficiency
Investments: Empirical Evidence from US Automobile Market
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INTRODUCTION
The dissertation explores the potential effectiveness of government energy efficiency
programs and regulations from both the producer and consumer perspectives. The last
three decades has seen the deployment of various energy conservation policies as part
of governments‘ energy policies. These energy efficiency programs are driven in part
by the desire to reduce energy consumption, lower greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
in order to mitigate the impacts of climate change, reduce criteria air pollutants, and to
provide affordable energy services. While it is widely acknowledged that there is still
a large potential for energy and greenhouse gas savings, the design of effective
policies to realize these potentials is challenging. For example, estimates from the
International Energy Association (IEA 2001) suggests that over 34% of the expected
carbon emissions under a scenario limiting the long term concentration of greenhouse
gases could be obtained solely from direct end use efficiency measures alone.
However, achieving this target presupposes that individuals will invest in energy
efficiency measures and firms will invest in innovations to commercialize energy
efficient technologies.
Consumer decision making and/or behavior involving energy consumption and
investment in energy efficiency projects have attracted increased scrutiny recently.
Policy design and evaluation have increasingly incorporated consumer behavioral
responses to policy interventions. Given the inter-relationship between consumer
behavior, energy and climate policy, it stands to reason that if consumers can be
nudged to change their behavior and reduce their energy consumption or be more
responsive to demand for weather induced changes in energy supply, we could
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significantly reduce the cost of compliance to several policies. However, the general
consensus is that consumers are generally not good optimizers with respect to the costs
and benefits of energy conservation. Consumers generally place different life-cycle
value on investments in energy efficiency than manufacturers and policymakers.
Behavioral economics offers insights and different perspectives regarding how
consumers value energy efficiency products or regard energy conservation efforts.
Behavioral economics concepts, supported by anecdotal evidence from experimental
economics suggests a set of reasons other than costs and benefits of why consumers
are not good optimizers: consumers do not consider energy efficiency issues to be
priority (work, family, healthcare, education and other family related matters are more
important than energy efficiency; households exhibit preference and perceptual
invariance in consumer choice situations; energy efficiency decision scenarios are
complicated, with multiple options and difficult mathematical calculations; and people
simply tend to procrastinate a lot (Kahneman and Tversky. 1979, Dhar and
Glazer1996; Abadie and Gay. 2006; Allcott and Mullainathan 2010, DellaVigna
2009). Also households show significant differences in behavior which can affect
energy consumption, suggesting that intervention strategies to promote sustainable
behaviors should result in significant energy savings in the future.
If the foregoing is true, then we need to answer the following important questions:
1. As consumers invest in energy efficiency projects, they will obtain economics

savings over the life of such projects, an important question is how consumers
will utilize the economic savings over the lifetime of their investment from an
energy efficient appliance?
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2.

What is the impact of strategic behavior by agents on the overall impact of
energy conservation programs?

3. If changes in consumers‘ consumption patterns occur, producers are likely to
adjust their production functions and what will be the effect on the overall
social welfare?
4. Are the incentives in some energy policies such that they incentivize agents to
behave in ways that are in conflict with the goals of regulations? Are these
incentives such that could lead to unintended consequences?
5. If consumers are different and choose durables according to some taste
distributions, are baseline estimates of the marginal willingness to pay for
reductions in future operating costs biased because of sorting?
How consumers weigh temporal effects of future fuel costs have policy implications.
This is because the nature of the temporal weighting helps in determining if market
failure exists and helps indicate whether policy prescriptions that affect initial vehicle
costs such as gas guzzlers tax will reduce fuel consumption at lower costs than
gasoline tax.
This dissertation answers these questions and more in three different essays. In the
first manuscript, we examine how consumers‘ strategic behavior could erase the net
benefits from a DR program. We rigorously estimate both peak and off peak changes
in consumption to better understand how strategic behavior by consumers affect the
net benefits of demand response (DR) programs. The main contributions of this
manuscript are twofold. First, it shows that DR energy policies can lead to unintended
consequences based on design and implementation. Second, we provide limited
3

evidence that consumers learn to erase the benefits from DR programs with time under
a technology program without price incentives. We use data from a stratified random
sample of 294 participating AC units. Because there is no data for a control group, we
estimate unit-specific non-linear consumption models and then compare load on event
days to predicted load on non-curtailment days. Importantly, we use data from the
summer 2007 training period. In contrast to subsequent summers and normal DR
designs, during the training period curtailment days were called for many different
temperature levels, not just the hottest days. This aspect means we are not predicting
out of sample, and we can have greater confidence in our econometric evidence.
We use a falsification test in which we find no changes in consumption during peak or
off-peak times on non-curtailment days that match the temperature and timing profile
of actual curtailment days to validate our results. First, we confirm that the SmartAC
program, like other DR and DLC programs, reduces peak load during event days. In
this case, peak consumption was reduced 19% on average. However, we also find
substantial increases in consumption in the hours preceding and the hours following an
event by 8% and 7% respectively. Essentially, load is being displaced from peak to
off-peak times. These behavioral changes mitigate the monetary benefits of the
program by 41%.
In the second manuscript, we also explore how the interaction of consumer behavior
and energy policy could result in unintended consequences by looking at how
consumers‘ choices of vehicle weight could result in increased fatalities under
regulatory constraints. In this manuscript, , we estimate the external costs of vehicle
weight in traffic accidents using a random sample of police reported accidents by
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estimating the number of fatally or seriously injured occupants in two vehicle crashes.
Our main challenge is that unobserved driver and occupant attributes could induce
risky drivers to cluster around higher vehicles, and also cause them to switch across
models as they re-optimize according to the conflicting incentives placed by gasoline
and safety policies. This is because, there are interrelated human factors, which are not
easily quantifiable, but are however related to vehicle weight and fatality/injury risk.
We use an estimation strategy that is robust enough to correct for such biases. The
estimation strategy is semiparametric and based around baseline gamma density
function. The estimation strategy is able to account for unobserved driver
heterogeneity. Unlike earlier studies (Jacobsen 2013; Anderson and Auffhammer
2013) our unique data set and methodology allows us to adjust for the fact that heavier
vehicles are involved in more fatal accidents than lighter vehicles ensuring that the
coefficients of weight are causal. We find that it is vehicle weight dispersion rather
than the absolute weight of vehicles involved in multiple vehicle crashes that is the
key factor determining injury severity. In a two-vehicle crash involving a lighter
vehicle and a heavier vehicle, the external costs imposed on the lighter vehicle
increases with weight of the heavier vehicle and decreases with own weight.
Specifically, we find that increasing the weight of the heavier vehicle over the lighter
vehicle by 1000 pounds increases the expected number of fatalities in the lighter
vehicle by about 39%. Second, increasing the weight of any vehicle increases the
probability of it being the heavier vehicle and increases the probability to be the
heavier vehicle in a collision and the probability of it being involved in a fatal
accident. The external costs translate to about 34 cents/gallon of gasoline.
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Finally, we combine these empirical results with a theoretical framework develop
simple tests to show that selection bias due to drivers of heavier vehicles involvement
in more fatal/serious injury accidents. The paper contributes to two lines of literature.
First is the rich set of literature on individual choice of activity on self protection and
averting behavior. The second area is the literature on the protective and aggressive
effects of vehicle weight on occupant safety (NRC 2002; Peltzman 1975).
In the final manuscript, I explore how sorting due to individual unobserved
heterogeneity could bias estimates of MWTP for lower fuel costs. The paper
contributes to the existing literature on Energy Paradox by providing empirical
evidence that unobserved consumer heterogeneity could result in different consumers
sorting into different classes of fuel efficient cars which results in consumers
undervaluing fuel economy. Unlike existing literature in this topic, this paper accounts
for sorting bias due to unobserved heterogeneity by using a random coefficient logit
with error components. The random utility model allows taste to vary across
consumers. I treat the discounted operating costs and vehicle costs as random
variables. This allows us to obtain a distribution of households‘ preferences for fuel
economy across the population.
Unlike other recent papers that identify consumers‘ response to fuel economy based
on monthly variation on gasoline prices alone, this manuscript supplements
information on gasoline prices with information on vehicle demand and elasticity
extracted from observed vehicle prices. I use data on household vehicle holdings from
the automobile extract of the consumer expenditure survey (CEX) covering the period
2002-2005. This dataset contains information on the vehicle purchases and driving
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habits of a random sample of US households. The CEX contains actual data on the
number of miles travelled by each household, what make of vehicle they buy, when
they buy and what vehicle they trade-in. The individual household data allows me to
match vehicles with the household demographic characteristics of those who own
them and estimate how different segments of the population value fuel economy
differently.
I find significant and substantial evidence of sorting and consumer heterogeneity in
the estimates of MWTP. The heterogeneity arises from huge differences in the amount
of miles travelled by consumers and heterogeneity in taste and time preferences. We
find that a substantial portion of the upper 95% of households in our sample correctly
value fuel economy (61%) as they are willing to pay $0.99 to reduce obtain a $1.00
discounted future gasoline costs over the lifetime of the vehicle. These results are in
contrast to those reported elsewhere by Alcott and Wozny (2009) but support results
from the simulation study by Bento et al 2012 who find that not accounting for sorting
bias and consumer heterogeneity could lead to a conclusion that consumers undervalue
fuel economy. In that light, our results might not necessarily imply that consumers
overvalue/undervalue fuel economy, but can be interpreted as being heterogeneous in
their valuation of fuel economy.
This dissertation is divided into three main parts. The first part, this section provides a
general introduction to the whole body of work. The second section is composed of
three different chapters, with each chapter containing a different manuscript. The last
section provides a general conclusion and tries to tie all the manuscript together.
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MANUSCRIPT 1

The Mitigating Effect of Strategic Behavior on the Net Benefits of a
Direct Load Control Program
By
Corey Lang and Edson Okwelum*
Department of Environmental and Natural Resource Economics
University of Rhode Island
Submitted for Publication to the Energy Economics Journal (Revise and
Resubmit)
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The Mitigating Effect of Strategic Behavior on the Net Benefits of a
Direct Load Control Program
Corey Lang and Edson Okwelum*
Department of Environmental and Natural Resource Economics
University of Rhode Island
October 22, 2014

Abstract
Demand response has become an important tool for utilities to manage load
during peak periods. While the effects of demand response programs on peak load
reductions are well studied and intuitive, assessments typically fail to recognize the
potential for off-peak behavioral responses that may mitigate the total benefits of the
program. Using smart meter consumption data on residential air conditioning units
enrolled in a direct load control program, this paper examines changes in consumption
prior to and after curtailment events. The results suggest substantial increases in off-peak
consumption, which reduce monetary benefits of the program by 41%.
Keywords: Demand Response, Precooling, Snapback, Strategic Behavior, Breakpoints

*

Email: (Lang) clang@mail.uri.edu, (Okwelum) edson_okwelum@my.uri.edu. We graciously thank Dr.
Abigail Anthony of Environmental Northeast for providing us with the energy consumption and weather
datasets. We also thank Nate Merrill for his comments on an earlier draft. All remaining errors are our own.
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Introduction
Many electricity utilities are challenged to meet demand during peak2
consumption, usually during summer afternoons. Further, peak demand has been
increasing at an average annual growth rate of 0.8% over the last 10 years (NERC
2013), heightening the need for solutions. Importing capacity from other areas and
firing peak generators are two costly solutions; these can increase the cost of
generation by $29.2-80/MWh. (EIA 2013). Alternatively, demand response (DR)
programs offer the possibility of no or low cost reductions in peak load, and utilities
and increasingly implementing these programs. While DR programs come in several
forms, they are generically classed into two groups. Programs with price incentivesTime of Use (TOU), Critical Peak Pricing (CPP), Real Time Pricing (RTP) and Peak
Time Pricing (PTR); and technology only programs with no price incentive- direct
load control (DLC) programs in which the utility can control usage of appliances for a
few hours per day during critical event days.
In general, all these programs seek to reduce peak load3 by changing consumption
prices or offering incentives to consumers. Impact evaluations have demonstrated
large benefits of DR programs (e.g., Herter 2007, Herter et al. 2007, Faruiqui and
George 2002, Crew et al. 1995, Matsukawa 2001, Binswanger 2001, Berkout et al.
2000, Gillingham et al. 2013, Thomas et al. 2013), and comparison of load reduction
during event hours show that DLC programs are more effective than programs with
time-varying price structures (Wolak 2011, Newsham et al 2010). However most of

2

Although, CAISO generally defines peak period as being from Hour Ending (HE) 0700 Pacific
Prevailing Time (PPT) through HE 2200 PPT, the peak period we refer to in this paper narrowly
defined to in line with PG&E‘s Summer Peak periods which is from 12:00 noon to 8:00 PM
3
Although not part of the program design, some of these programs also reduce energy use during offpeak hours
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these assessments tend to only examine benefits in terms of peak reductions, thereby
ignoring behavioral responses that could be happening in technology only and
potentially overestimating the total benefits. Although behavioral responses in
programs with time-varying price incentives have been looked at in terms of load
shifting, the closely related concept of precooling and snapback (two types of
behavioral responses in technology only) less so (Newsham et al 2010, Jessoe and
Rapson 2014, Wolak 2011).
The purpose of this paper is to rigorously estimate both peak and off peak changes
in consumption to better understand net benefits of DLC programs with no price
incentive or behavioral aspect. We examine Pacific Gas and Electric‘s (PG&E)
SmartAC program, which is designed to reduce peak cooling load by directly
controlling air conditioning units of participants.
We use data from a stratified random sample of 294 participating AC units.
Because there is no data for a control group, we estimate unit-specific non-linear
consumption models and then compare load on event days to predicted load.
Importantly, we use data from the summer 2007 training period. In contrast to
subsequent summers and normal DR designs, during the training period curtailment
days were called for many different temperature levels, not just the hottest days. This
aspect means we are not predicting out of sample, and we can have greater confidence
in our econometric evidence. Our methodology is validated by a falsification test in
which we find no changes in consumption during peak or off-peak times on noncurtailment days that match the temperature and timing profile of actual curtailment
days.
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Several key results emerge from our analysis. First, we confirm that the SmartAC
program, like other DR and DLC programs, reduces peak load during event days. In
this case, peak consumption was reduced 19% on average. However, we also find
substantial increases in consumption in the hours preceding and the hours following an
event by 8% and 7% respectively. Essentially, load is being displaced from peak to
off-peak times. These behavioral changes mitigate the monetary benefits of the
program by 41%.
The main contribution of this paper is to show DR energy policies can lead to
unintended consequences. We contribute to the emerging body of work on the
perverse incentives in energy policies (e.g., Fowlie 2009, Davis and Kahn 2010,
Goulder and Stavins 2011). Particularly relevant to this paper are works by Holladay
et al. (2013), and Jessoe and Rapson (2014). Holladay et al. (2013) examine changes
in energy production when media outlets relay emergency calls from utilities for
electricity reduction during off-peak hours on curtailment days. They estimate that
behavioral responses lead to an increase in generation cost of about $43.70/MWh to
$61.70/MWh in the late morning and early evening on emergency days. We estimate a
smaller increase in generation cost, around $21/MWh, but the results largely
corroborate each other. In contrast, to Jessoe and Rapson (2014) who examine the
added benefit of load reduction during peak hours on non-event days due to learning,
we look at behavioral responses on curtailment days in non-event hours in a
technology only program.
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Background on the SmartAC Program
PG&E‘s SmartAC program is a DLC program designed to reduce participating
households cooling load during peak load times. The program works by directly
controlling air conditioning during peak hours on designated curtailment days.
Curtailment events can only occur between the hours of 11 am to 7 pm from May 1 to
October 31 and only for a total of six hours per day and for no more than 100 hours
per cooling season. Before and after each event, the customer has complete control
over their AC unit(s).
Typically, curtailment days are called when system load is expected to be
burdensome, usually the hottest days of the year. The California Independent System
Operator (ISO) may declare a system emergency when an electric-resource generation
facility reaches or exceeds a certain heat rate (usually heat rates of 15,000 British
thermal units per kW).However, PG&E can also call events to test the devices and for
other discretionary reasons such as transmission or distribution system overload. The
Appendix gives a more detailed description of the process of initiating a control event.
In contrast to the normal objective of the program, summer 2007 was a training
period, and curtailment days were called on days with a variety of temperatures, not
just the hottest days of the year. The inclusion of typical summer temperature days is
important because it allows the utility to test the operational performance of the
control devices.
The SmartAC Program uses paging signals to reduce cooling load of enrolled
air conditioning units during times of peak system demand. The control devices are
either programmable communicating thermostats (PCTs) and/or direct load control
adaptive switches (switches). Both technologies receive signals through a paging
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device but differ by how they lower air conditioning load. Unlike the adaptive switch
control devices, the thermostats provide additional functionality to participants.
Demand reduction during curtailment events are achieved by either adjusting
thermostat temperature set points or limiting the duty cycles of switches in the units.
The PCTs implement load reduction by increasing the cooling set point temperature
on the thermostat controls when an event signal is received. Increasing the PCT set
point ensures that temperature increases are equitably distributed across the population
irrespective of house, occupant temperature preference and air conditioner attributes.
The switches on the other hand, reduce air conditioner load by directly controlling
how the unit‘s compressor operates.4The SmartAC program was structured such that
70% of the program participants had control switches and 30% smart thermostats.
Customers with either device can only opt out of an event by either calling a toll-free
number or accessing the program website5.
There were two schedules by which load was reduced for those households
with PCTs, and PG&E alternated between them. The first schedule set thermostats
back one degree every other hour, resulting in a maximum setback of three degrees in
each 6 hour curtailment event. The second schedule set thermostats back one degree
every hour for the first four hours of the event and then held constant. This last
strategy was done in an attempt to evenly spread the load reduction resulting in a
gradual temperature decline as against the steep temperature from the first strategy.
4

Switches generally control air conditioner load by limiting the compressor run-time or duty cycle to a
maximum over a period. When activated on curtailment days, the switches use adaptive algorithm to
reduce air conditioner load to a percentage of the load on ―learning days‖. The ―learning days‖ are days
with similar characteristics as potential curtailment days and are chosen by the program administrator.
The observed duty cycle on these learning days provides an estimate of expected duty cycle on a
curtailment day.
5
While participants had the option to opt of the program, this option was never exercised by the
households (KEMA 2008).
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For units with adaptive switches, load reduction during curtailment event was
achieved by limiting compressor duty-cycle to a maximum amount in the curtailment
period.
Using information from focus groups and similar program evaluation surveys
in other locations, participants were recruited into the SmartAC program through
direct mail campaigns. Participants into the SmartAC program were first enlisted in
the spring of 2007 in San Joaquin County. However this has been expanded to include
all service areas covered by the utility. As at the beginning of July 2007 when the first
curtailment event was called, the program had enrolled over 2,857. The 297
households sampled for this evaluation, are located in the city of Stockton
and it‘s surrounding areas (San Joaquin County). And as of August 2007, which was
the system peak, there were 8,193 participants in the program, which was almost
composed exclusively of residential customers with less than 1% commercial
customers. The program has subsequently grown in popularity to such an extent that
by January 2008, there were 26,000 households enrolled in the program with an
additional 22,000 waiting to be supplied control technology. All program participants
received a one-off incentive payment of $25 in return for up to 100 hours/year of load
control. In addition, participants in the program evaluation group were given a
maximum payment of $110, based on the number of questionnaires answered in a
survey conducted at the completion of the program‘s first year. Also, participants in
the PCT group were given the thermostats free, with a market value of $200 (KEMA,
2008).The goal of the program is to enroll a sufficient number of participants to
achieve load reduction of 305 MW with over 95% coming from residential accounts.
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Methodology
We develop a methodology that estimates air conditioner load usage as a function
of weather control (temperature and humidity) and time of day, parameterizing each
unit separately. Then we use these predictions to compare actual usage on curtailment
days to expected usage. While there are several methods for estimating baseline
consumption patterns and load comparisons, we use a regression-based baseline
modeling approach. The wide scale adoption of smart grid meters and availability of
high-resolution, hourly or 15-minute energy consumption data has contributed a great
deal to improvements in regression-based baseline models (Armel et al. 2013;
Newsham et al. 2011; Santin and Itard 2010; Santin et al. 2009). Mathieu et al. (2011)
find that the regression-based baseline model performs better than most models used
in evaluating demand response programs. Given that the regressions coefficients are
from a least squares estimator, Mittelhammer et al. (2000) show that coefficients from
these models should be unbiased and consistent as long as we have controlled for all
the relevant predictor variables (Newsham et al 2011). In addition, the regression
based model allows for customer-specific response estimates to be used separately for
decision making or easily averaged to any degree of aggregation.
We model each air conditioner‘s baseline electric load as a function of time of the
day, relative humidity, cooling degree days, heat index and a 631 index. By estimating
parameters for each unit, we better capture unique occupant cooling preferences and
differences in physical properties of residences. We use 15-minute-interval fixed
effects, which captures the pattern of usage of each unit. Cooling degree days enters
into the model as a 2-breakpoint demand function.6 The first breakpoint is the unit‘s

6

Figure 1 depicts the intuition of the 2-breakpoint model.
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base or reference temperature, which marks the temperature above which air
conditioning is used. The second breakpoint represents the temperatures point above
which the air conditioner runs at 100% duty cycle. This specification allows for three
different regimes of sensitivity to temperature changes. The heat index is a function of
relative humidity and temperature and gives an idea how hot it given the relative
humidity and actual air temperature. We use an equation that reproduces NOAA‘s heat
index chart to estimate the heat index for all participating units. The 631 index is a
weighted average of temperature and is estimated as 60% of a given day, 30% of prior
day and 10% of two days prior average temperature readings (CAISO 2013)7.
Specifically, we estimate the baseline model using only non-curtailment days for each
unit as follows:

Lithd   it   i Bih   i Cih  i Rih   i X ih   iYi   ihd

(1)

where Lithd is the observed load in kWh of unit i in time t of day d,  it is unit-15 minute
fixed effect, and Bih and C ih are the degrees Fahrenheit above the first and second
breakpoints, respectively. Rih is unit i‘s relative humidity at hour h, Xih is heat index
for unit i at hour h and Yi is the 631 temperature index for unit i. The breakpoints are
defined as follows:
Bih  max(Th  bi ,0)

Cih  max(Th  ci ,0 

(2)

where Th is the hourly average temperature of day d, and bi and ci are the unit specific
breakpoints. These equations are similar in structure to the calculation of cooling

7

http://www.caiso.com/Documents/2013SummerLoads_ResourcesAssessment.pdf
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degree days, except that cooling degree days is calculated with a set breakpoint,
usually 65°F, whereas here we allow the breakpoints to take a range of values. α, γ, β,
δ, ε, δ, and ζ are parameters to be estimated.
For each unit, we implement a grid search to find the breakpoint values that fit the
consumption patterns best. We estimate the model for values of bi in the range of 65°F
to 84°F and for values of ci in the range of 78°F to 90°F, both in increments of 1° and
with the constraint that bi < ci . The optimal combination of bi and ci is chosen based
on which model maximizes R-squared.8
One drawback to using the regression-based approach is that out-of-sample
predictions could perform poorly due to the parameterization. Regression-based
baseline models assume that the functional relationship between load and weather
(cooling degree-days) is the same on curtailment days as on the non-curtailment days
(KEMA 2008). There are two reasons to be optimistic that this is not a large problem
in our case. First, our empirical approach allows for non-linearity in the load-weather
relationship, which should enable the upper tail of the distribution to be modeled
better. Second, as explained in more detail in the next section, curtailment days were
not temperature outliers, and so our out-of-sample weather has strong statistical
overlap with the in-sample days.
From the parameters of the baseline models determined with non-curtailment days,
we then predict demand on curtailment days. The difference between actual
consumption and predicted consumption is the key statistic for determining the effect
of the program for both hours during the event and hours before and after the event.
8

While R-squared is typically not thought to be a useful judge of predictive power, in this case we are
only comparing models with the same number of explanatory variables. So R-squared would indicate
the same breakpoints as optimal as would AIC or BIC.
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Data
This section details the multiple sources of data used for the analysis. The main
dataset is the 15 minute interval consumption data covering the period June 12 through
October 31, 2007.We additionally use weather data to model consumption and data on
the marginal cost of generating 1MWh in the wholesale market to monetize the
benefits of changes in consumption on curtailment days.
Electric Load Data
As part of the SmartAC program load impact assessment, air conditioner load
loggers were installed on a sample of 352 participating units. These units were
contained in a stratified random sample of 297 (146 PCTs and 151 switches) program
participants from a population 2,917.9 The sample was stratified by type of device
(PCT or switch), total number of cooling tons from all units (less than four tons, four
tons or more), and multiple units (yes or no). The sample design, and stratification as
well as design sample sizes, and installed sample sizes are presented in Table A1 in
the Appendix. We removed one unit for having an anomalously high load of 253 kW
(over 10 times larger than the mean load) and four units for having 0 kW consumption
throughout the study period. 53 units were dropped because of missing data, which left
us with a final sample of 254 participants and 294 loggers.
Figure A5 in the online appendix is a density plot of load with the dashed vertical lines
representing the quartile positions. About fifty percent of the participating units‘ rated
KW loads were less than 20KW with the lowest unit having a rated load of 2.8KW
and the maximum unit with rated KW load of 35KW.
Electricity consumption for the participating units were recorded by the data
loggers in 15-minute ampere readings, which recorded the average instantaneous amp
9

Some participants had more than one unit.
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reading for each minute during that period. The amperage was converted to kW using
the voltage levels measured at the units. The average instantaneous readings were then
converted to kWh by summing each participating unit‘s KW consumption over the
four 15 minute interval readings within that hour. We discarded data on weekends and
holidays, as curtailment days are only called on normal weekdays. In total, we had
over 3.9 million observations at the 15-minute-unit level. The mean KW consumption
was 0.26KW with a standard deviation of 0.85, while the maximum KW value was
7.66.
Temperature Data
Daily average temperatures were obtained from the NOAA data web
site.10While we do not know the location of each sample unit, PG&E mapped each
unit to the nearest weather station and we use this to match each sample unit with
weather data.
Figure2 is a plot of the density of the average daily temperature data used in
the analysis with vertical lines representing the average daily temperature at which
curtailment events were called. Due to the experimental nature of this program in
2007, many curtailment days were called for average heat days when peak load
reductions were unlikely needed. Calling curtailment events on days with mild
temperature is important because it ensures that our out-of-sample predictions will
have strong statistical overlap with the in-sample days. In addition, it allows program
administrators to obtain data on the performance of the technologies over the whole
period of the cooling season and get a good performance of the technologies on
learning days.

10

http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/
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Marginal Cost of Generating Electricity
In order to monetize the net savings from the SmartAC program, we obtained data
on the marginal cost of generating 1MWh of electricity from California ISO website.11
We use the locational marginal pricing (LMP) at Stockton, CA. We believe that the
conditions existing in 2007 in the California ISO (CAISO) means that the price data
we use are indicative of both the relative scarcity and abundance of the product and
the sensitivity of the demand to variations in price. The CAISO market uses balancing
energy market in allocating energy to match load less than 10 minutes ahead
forecasting scenarios. This market has two important features, namely an hourly, paidas-bid market that is conducted at the intertie points with neighboring control areas,
and a five-minute, single price auction market for internal generators. Prices for the
balancing energy market are settled at a market determined price that is set by the
most expensive energy dispatched by the system in any given interval using a uniform
price auction. The LMP reflects the energy value at a specific location at a specific
time, fluctuating with time of day, and can surge significantly with extreme
temperature and other unpredictable events. The LMP data we use is hourly. During
peak load hours on curtailment days, the mean price is $100/MWh, with a maximum
of $230/MWh and a minimum of $60/MWh. During off-peak times, the mean LMP
value is $58/MWh.
Results
DR programs have historically played significant roles in lowering the costs of
meeting peak demand reduction and reducing environmental impacts. DR resources

11

http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-electric/california/caiso-archives.asp
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offset the need for building additional peaking generation units and supply some low
carbon flexible capacity utilities need to ensure real-time balance and reliability of the
system. Given that the overall demand is an important determinant of use of fossil
fuels, DR resources support the integration of increasing levels of nonrenewable
resources.

Baseline model
While our primary interest is changes in consumption patterns induced by
curtailment days, we first examine the baseline model estimation for indications that it
captures demand well. It terms of model fit, R-squared averages 0.76 with a 90%
confidence interval of [0.53, 0.97], which is an improvement over papers using
temperature regressions or single breakpoint models (Herter 2007, Reed et al. 2009,
Newsham et al 2011). In addition, the average participants R-squared show that the
model is able to account for over 94% of the variation in cooling load.
The breakpoints resulting from the optimization showed substantial heterogeneity.12
Figures 3a and 3b are density plots of the estimated first and second breakpoints,
respectively, for participating AC units. The mean value of the first breakpoint is 71°F
with a 90% confidence interval of [66, 82], which seems like reasonable temperatures
for AC units to be switched on. The distribution of the second breakpoint appears
bimodal, with peaks at 80°F and 88°F.The two figures illustrate how different units
have different breakpoints because of the differences in the buildings mass, outside
temperature and user preferences. This indicates the importance of modeling this
heterogeneity, which may be lost with a more traditional panel estimator.

12

For some of the units (less than 3%), the second breakpoint was not used in estimating the baseline
model. However, all the units had the first breakpoint in the baseline model.
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In addition, the coefficient estimates on the breakpoint parameters were highly
statistically significant. 88.4% were significant at the 0.1% level, and the remaining
were significant at either 5% or 10% level. In contrast, when the models are estimated
with uniform base temperature values of 65°F and 72°F for the first and second
breakpoints, respectively, slightly less than 65% of the coefficient estimates were
significant at the 10% level. Thus, our grid search method and 15-minute fixed effects
substantially improves model fit.

Changes in consumption on curtailment days
In Figure 4, we plot a single unit‘s load profile for a typical curtailment day and
non curtailment on the same axes. The dark, solid lines represent actual load profile
while the red, dashed lines are for predicted load on a typical curtailment day. The
Figure shows a trough in between two peaks. The two peaks represent precooling and
snapback loads, while the trough represents load reduction during peak period. Next,
we quantify these figures. Table 1 presents the results of our analysis of estimated
change in consumption before, during and after a curtailment event on a curtailment
day. Results are presented for each of the 13 curtailment days as well as an overall
mean. The values in parenthesis represent standard errors computed by dividing the
standard deviation obtained from a t-test of the difference in means between predicted
and observed load with the square root of the number of observations. All values are
significant at the 1% level except for the amount of precooling on July 17, which is
negative and not significant. Therefore, the value for July 17 might just be random
noise.
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The first two columns give the date and average daily temperature of each
curtailment day. During the curtailment event, the results indicate that the average
sample AC unit reduced load between 0.020 kWh/h to 0.754KWh/h, with an average
reduction of 0.410 kWh across all curtailment days. (We normalize kWh reductions by
per hour because the length of curtailment varies between four and six hours). These
estimates are consistent with prior studies that have estimated the load impact of
demand response programs and found values ranging from 0KWh/h to 0.75KWh/h
(KEMA 2007, 2008, Herter et al. 2007).
Table 1 also displays average changes is consumption for the three hours before
and three hours after an event. Our results suggest that program participants do
increase AC usage both before and after an event.13Precooling occurred in 11 of the 13
curtailment days. Precooling over the period ranged from 0.040 kWh/h to 0.320
kWh/h with an average value of 0.127 kWh/h. The amount of snapback ranges from
0.009 kWh/h to 0.240 kWh/h with mean of 0.115KWh/h. On a per hour basis, precooling equates to 31% of the reduction during the curtailment period, and snapback
equates to 28%.
Taken together, these figures imply that participating residents are consuming
between 25-35% more in the hours immediately before and after a curtailment event
than they would ordinarily have consumed. These results quantify behavior taken by
households to maintain comfort during curtailment days.

13

An alternative version of the model was estimated in which hours of the day fixed effect and
curtailment day variable were interacted. The positive sign on the interaction term pre-curtailment hours
and curtailment day variable indicates precooling while a positive sign between post-curtailment hours
with curtailment day variables indicate significant snapback event respectively. A test of joint
significance applied to the results from the curtailment period and the surrounding hours indicate that
the SmartAC impacts are statistically significant and in the expected direction across the curtailment
period, pre-curtailment hours, and post-curtailment hours respectively.
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Learning over time
Table 1 indicates that households behave strategically to pre-cool their homes
before curtailment. We wanted to further investigate if the amount of pre-cooling
increased over time, suggesting that customers were learning how to best pre-cool
their homes to cope with curtailment. If there is a pattern of learning, then the later
days in the summer will be more indicative of the amount of pre-cooling to expect as
this program and others like it mature.
First, a comparison of the amount of precooling on the curtailment days that occur
early in the summer reveals that that pre-cooling is increasing over time. Second,
customers precool their homes more in the late, hotter summer days than curtailment
days with lower temperature. This last fact implies that there exists a positive
correlation between the amount of precooling and temperature. This make sense
because one would more pre-cooling will be needed to maintain comfort levels. This
last fact presents challenges in trying to identify the evidence of learning from
temperature effects.
To help us decipher whether the larger precooling amount in later, hotter summer
days are due to learning by customers, and not a reflection of those days having higher
temperatures, we undertake additional analysis. First, we look at amount of precooling
in late hot summers days that are non-curtailment but occurring after two consecutive
curtailment days. And then compare this to the amount of precooling occurring in noncurtailment days following consecutive curtailment days in July. Second, we also look
at the load shape a day before curtailment and a day after curtailment. However, given
the limited number of curtailment days in our sample, these two approaches could not
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conclusively reveal additional information about whether or not households learn to
precool their homes over the course of the program14.
The direction and size of precooling and rebound we find are in line with figures
reported elsewhere from experiments about using building thermal mass to reduce
peak cooling load (Xu 2006, Xu et al 200415). However, unlike Jessoe and Rapson
(2014) who found that households learn to conserve energy beyond the conservation
periods during peak hours under demand response programs with price incentives and
behavioral intervention; our results show that whatever learning (if it does occur) that
occurs under a direct load control program without price incentives is in the opposite
direction: households learn to erase gains made during peak periods through
precooling of their homes given comfort constraints. The two conflicting results
provide an insight into how consumers‘ behavior responds to non-monetary
intervention such as technology and a monetary intervention.
Heterogeneity by technology and load
We are also interested in how curtailment affects units with different installed
technologies (PCT vs. switch) and units with different loads. Table 2 shows the
average changes in consumption averaged across all curtailment days splitting the
sample various ways. Panel A splits the sample by choice of technology. The results

14

In addition, we examined whether conditional on temperature, the curtailment days that
occur on dates later in the summer have positive coefficients which could indicate some evidence of
learning. We estimated a regression similar to equation 1, but using all days (both curtailment and noncurtailment days) and including variables to account for curtailment event and number of prior
curtailment days in the summer experienced by households. The results of such regressions are
presented in the online appendix in Table 7. We see a positive coefficient for the interaction terms of
hours prior to curtailment period and the number of consecutive prior curtailment events experienced.
This is just an additional indication that learning could be occurring and should be explored additionally
if one has additional data.
15

Xu 2006, precooling could shift about 20-50% of peak load to non-peak load using building thermal
mass.
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show the same general pattern of decreases in consumption during the event and
increases in consumption before and after the event for both groups. However, the
changes for the PCT group are larger in every stage – more reductions during the
event and more pre-cooling and snapback. One possible explanation for the
heterogeneous change in consumption between the PCT units relative to those with
adaptive switches could be related to how the two technologies effect load reduction
during curtailment days. Another reason could be that the larger changes in
consumption by thermostat compared to the adaptive switches is a reflection of the
higher variation in thermostat load compared to switches. The algorithms for the two
technologies are such that load reduction by units with adaptive switches is predictable
and more evenly distributed over the curtailment period compared to units with PCTs
(Agnew et al. 2008).
Also, within PCT group, the two different strategies for achieving load reduction
results in different outcomes during the curtailment events, but do not seem to affect
the amount of precooling and snapback. On the average, PCT units exposed to the
steep temperature declines reduce about 13% more load given that all other conditions
are controlled for.
Panel B partitions units into quartiles based on load size. Similar to Panel A, we
see the same pattern across all four quartiles. However, another pattern emerges that as
load grows so does the magnitude of consumption change. This finding is consistent
with intuition because units with a larger load are likely to be used more and thus have
larger decreases during curtailment. Further, larger units are likely to pre-cool more if
occupants want to maintain the same comfort level during the curtailment event.
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Falsification test
In order to alleviate concerns that the estimated changes in consumption during
event days were a spurious result, we conducted a falsification test with proxy days
treated as curtailment days. To implement this, we sought a match for each curtailment
day that had the same average temperature, was within two days of the curtailment
day, and was not a curtailment day itself. Matches meeting these criteria were found
for eight of 13 curtailment days. Our definition of proxy days uses only non-holiday
weekdays, and accounts for daily maximum and minimum temperature. We also
attempted to define proxy days using humidity; however it was difficult matching on
several covariates. We then re-estimated our baseline model excluding both the true
curtailment days and the proxy days, and then calculated the difference between actual
and expected consumption for the proxy days. The results, shown in Table 3, suggest
no evidence of systematic increases or decreases in consumption during any of the
three periods (before, during, and after the event). Magnitudes in all three columns
tend to be smaller than the numbers in Table 1 and flip sign from day to day.
In addition, we relaxed the criteria for selecting the proxy days and used all noncurtailment days as proxy. Doing this allows us to relax the temperature control and
possibly account for humidity. We performed a Monte Carlo exercise, first excluding
each non-curtailment day and then estimate the model and predicting demand for that
proxy day. We did this for each non-curtailment day in the sample (including
weekends and public holidays) and plotted the average observed load and predicted
load. The results are presented in Figure 7. These results validate our methodology and
results.
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Calculating peak load savings and net savings
We now examine the complete effect of the SmartAC program and the mitigating
effect that pre-cooling and snapback have on total benefits. Table 4 reports the results.
Columns A and B present the peak load reduction benefits of the program in terms of
kWh savings and monetary savings per unit. Columns D and E present net benefits of
the program, additionally accounting for pre-cooling and snapback.16
As expected and as foreshadowed in earlier results, on average, units reduced
consumption by a total of 23.218 kWh during the summer‘s peak events. Monetizing
these reductions indicates that PG&E saved each participant nearly $41. However,
after accounting for precooling and snapback, kWh savings are reduced by 41% and
monetary savings are reduced by 42%.17These results make clear the importance of
accounting for behavioral responses to DLC programs when determining program
benefits.
Column G presents the cost of conservation, which is calculated as the marginal
cost of generating the extra electricity needed to meet the increased off-peak demand
due to conservation during peak times. The values indicate that reductions during peak
times cost the utilities an additional $21.07/MWh on average, with values ranging
from $5.40/MWh to $43.41/MWh. Of course, this is cheaper than the cost of
generation during peak times, so the net benefit is still positive. But it is important to
know that the cost is not zero. These estimates are similar though smaller to those of
16

The values in column A were obtained by averaging hourly savings during the curtailment period for
all units. Those in column B were obtained by first multiplying the hourly cost of generating 1MWh
with the change in consumption at that hour, and thereafter computing the average value. In the next
column, C, we add the precooling and snapback values to the change in consumption during the
curtailment period. Finally, the values in column D were obtained by summing the product the change
in consumption in each hour with the marginal cost of generating 1MWh during each hour.
17
The discrepancy between percentage reductions is due to the higher generation costs during peak
times.
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Holladay et al. (2013), who estimate conservations costs ranging from $43.70/MWh to
$61.70/MWh.
Despite the large reductions in net benefits from pre-cooling and snapback, the
program still offers substantial benefits. Projecting the net savings onto the entire
8,193 customers enrolled in the program leads to an estimated $194,000 in utility bill
savings. Further, the hotter days in the latter part of the summer yield the largest
monetary savings, due both to larger kWh reductions and higher marginal prices. This
result suggests that per-unit savings are likely to be larger for summers in which
curtailment occurs mostly on very hot days.
Estimates of Environmental Impacts
We use the load reduction estimates from the program to estimate the overall
environmental impacts of the programs. We make simplifying assumptions that
increased consumption increases in the period before and after curtailment occurs
when natural gas is at the margin and the consumption reductions during the
curtailment period occur when coal is the margin. While these assumptions may be
very simplistic, they ensure that whatever environmental impact we attribute to the
program are lower bounds. In addition, it does reflect what is obtainable since natural
gas is the non-base load source in the Western Interconnection area. We use the
hourly marginal emissions intensities from Graff-Zivin, Kotchen and Mansur (2012)
to multiply the changes in consumption to estimate the environmental impacts.
The result from the analysis is presented in columns C and F of Table 4. In
Column C, we report the values of reduced emission due to load curtailment
attributable to the program. Column C reports estimates of emissions reduction due to
avoided or displaced generation from coal of about 0.78 metric tons of CO2e per unit
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during the curtailment period. Finally, in Column F, we report net environmental
effects by aggregating across the periods: precooling, curtailment and snapback
periods. The program results in a net reduction of pollution even after accounting for
increased emissions due to behavioral response by households of 0.42 metric tons of
CO2e per unit. Given the high intra-day volatility in the marginal fuel, the emissions
reductions we attribute to the program are lower abound.
Policy Discussions
Faruqui and Sergici (2009) and Newsham et al (2010) provide reviews of
several studies on evaluation of DR programs and how these results vary. These
papers provide reviews of programs using technology-based standards compared to
programs with price incentives and information feedback. A third type of program
considers the customer behavior other than pricing incentives like goal setting,
commitment, social approval, consumption feedback, etc (Allcott and Rogers 2014,
Jessoe and Rapson 2014).

Program with Price Incentives
Programs with price incentives achieve peak load reduction by encouraging
either the elimination of on-peak energy consumption activities or shifting of such
activities to other periods through economic incentives. The economic incentives are
usually in the form differential pricing in residential electricity rate structure based on
time of delivery of electricity. That is, utilities encourage behavioral modifications by
charging higher prices during periods of high system-wide demand and lower prices in
other periods. Alternatively, utilities could compensate households for every kWh
reduced during periods of high system-wide demand. These programs come in various
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forms. While programs with price incentives have been effective at reducing peak
load, their relative effectiveness depends largely on how the price incentives are
structured. Generally, CPP programs seems to be very effective at reducing peak
loads, whereas TOU less so (Newsham et al 2010). Two main reasons have been
proffered to account for the higher on-peak load reduction of CPP programs compared
to TOU programs: price and frequency of occurrence. The intuition is that in the
absence of enabling technologies, households are more apt to respond to a CPP
program given the small number of events that are called over each summer. However,
under the TOU pricing, households have to change their behavior daily, which could
be cumbersome. In addition, CPP programs have been shown to reduce energy during
peak periods on non-event days, implying that behaviors formed on event days can be
transferred to non-event days (Newsham et al 2010, Faruqui and Sergici 2008).
PTR programs are less effective at reducing peak load than CPP programs
even though they are similar (e.g., Newsham et al 2010). However, unlike CPP
programs, PTR programs are designed to provide rebates on bills for reduction in peak
load. This result is in line with evidence from Psychology which found that people
respond more to ―sticks‖ than ―carrots‖ (Kahneman and Tversky 1984). This also
suggests that behavior-based programs might make price-based policies more effective
by making people more aware of potential savings
Behavior Based Programs
A basic tenet of behavior change is providing consumers with regular feedback
on their energy consumption to take action and achieve greater levels of energy
savings over and above what traditional price based incentive programs can
accomplish. Behavior based programs do not use monetary benefits to encourage load
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reduction. The literature on behavior change is rich and most are rooted in social
sciences (Jessoe and Rapson 2014, Alcott and Rogers 2014, Allcott and Mullainathan
2010).
Allcott and Rogers use large data sets from a series of programs by OPOWER
to study how providing households‘ feedback information on their energy
consumptions induces conservation behavior. They find that such behavioral programs
result in about 1.1 to 2.8% reduction in energy consumption relative to baselines.
Jessoe and Rapson 2014 use a field experiment to study the additional impact of highfrequency information about households‘ residential electricity usage on the price
elasticity of demand in addition to household‘s response to price incentives. They find
that households that were not provided information reduce peak demand by about 26% in response to price incentives alone. Additionally, they find that households that
were provided with the high frequency information on price are more likely to reduce
peak load by 8-22% over and above the amount due to price incentives alone.
Technology Only Programs
Technology only programs are designed to reduce peak load through the use of
equipment to modify the operation of appliances during peak period (Newsham 2010,
CAISO 2013, Faruqui and Wood 2008). DLC programs are designed to reduce peak
use on a small number of event days without time-varying price incentives or behavior
interventions. From a review of literature on program evaluation on DR programs,
DLC based programs are the most efficient (Newsham et al 2010, Faruiqui and Wood
2008). A review of peer reviewed literature shows that DLC programs reduce
approximately 0.25KWh/h to 1.4KWh/h per household during curtailment periods.
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Our findings indicate technology only programs result in larger load reductions
during the curtailment periods. This is because technology only programs provide
fewer margins for adjustment (Newsham et al 2010). This result is expected from an
automated system because technology provides opportunity for participating
households to choose their preferred mode of response once during the program
lifetime and not be bothered to remember when curtailment events are due. However,
if we account for precooling and rebound, the net savings are comparable to load
reduction from other programs with price incentives.
Although, we find that the result of customers‘ behavioral response and the
interaction of technology under a non-monetary intervention results in the diminution
of conservation gains, the fact that customers may learn to precool their homes at
higher temperatures could also provide policy benefits. First, the fact that households
precool their homes under a DLC only program is an indication that residential
households may be averse to relinquishing complete control of their air conditioners to
utilities during summer peak times. Perhaps giving consumers back some type of
control during curtailment hours could be one way of improving the performance as it
could provide additional avenues for adjustment. Second, the evidence of precooling
suggests that utilities should bundle some sort of time-varying price incentive into
DLC program to make them more efficient.

Taken together, our results suggests a hybrid policy program that incorporate
some form of automation and time-varying price structure with behavioral aspects will
perform better and reduce the most amount of peak load while still maintaining
consumer comfort.
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Conclusion
Deregulation has greatly impacted the ability for the electricity industry in the
US to make profit. Specifically, additional generation capacity is no longer guaranteed
a rate of return. Because of the costliness of new capacity and the growing pressure
peak demand places on the system, there has been increasing implementation of
demand response programs as away to curb peak load. DR can also be applied for
energy conservation in general. Recent literature has quantified the benefits of DR by
measuring the amount of load reduced during peak periods, and the impacts are
substantial. However, little work has been done to quantify the impact of behavioral
responses to such programs. This paper seeks to contribute to that gap in the literature
by examining the strategic response of participants in one such DLC demand response
program and how that response may undermine its effectiveness.
Our results suggest that program participants increase consumption before and
after event hours relative to the counterfactual. These results are intuitive, but are also
of critical importance as DR policies move forward and the need to understand net
benefits and forecast demand grows. For example, the SmartAC program, now in its
seventh year, has over 100,000 enrolled customers. To be clear, the results still support
DR and DLC programs as an effective way to curb peak demand; but, the true
conservation cost is not zero.
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Figures and Tables

Load

Figure 1: Density of Load Distribution with Quartiles
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Notes: Point B on the horizontal axis represents the first breakpoint, the point at which cooling
starts. Point C, represents the point at which air conditioner runs at 100% duty circle.
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Figure 3-a: Distribution of Estimated First Breakpoint Parameter
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Notes: Figure 3a is a kernel density estimate of the first breakpoint for all the participating AC units, while
Figure 3b is the kernel density estimates for the second breakpoint temperature for all participating units.
Both densities were estimated with the epanechnikov kernel and optimal smoothing constant of 2.0
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Table 1: Average Precooling, Load Impact Response & Rebound during Curtailment
Days by all Units
Date

Average Daily
Temperature (oF)

12-Jul

71

17-Jul

73

23-Jul

81

26-Jul

74

27-Jul

76

1-Aug

77

9-Aug

75

10-Aug

78

21-Aug

84

22-Aug

83

28-Aug

84

30-Aug

87

31-Aug

88

Mean

Average Change in Consumption (KWh/h)
Before Event
0.000
(0.000)
-0.090
(0.300)
0.320
(0.002)
0.040
(0.001)
0.029
(0.005)
0.110
(0.052)
0.060
(0.003)
0.099
(0.004)
0.221
(0.001)
0.159
(0.001)
0.173
(0.038)
0.310
(0.000)
0.230
(0.000)
0.127

During Event After Event
-0.331
(0.004)
-0.020
(0.006)
-0.720
(0.013)
-0.120
(0.001)
-0.140
(0.018)
-0.615
(0.012)
-0.217
(0.013)
-0.320
(0.001)
-0.564
(0.030)
-0.487
(0.001)
-0.553
(0.001)
-0.515
(0.001)
-0.754
(0.034)
-0.410

0.045
(0.011)
0.050
(0.013)
0.090
(0.021)
0.109
(0.015)
0.119
(0.017)
0.177
(0.020)
0.009
(0.002)
0.240
(0.016)
0.101
(0.020)
0.180
(0.021)
0.120
(0.022)
0.129
(0.023)
0.133
(0.022)
0.115

Notes: The values in columns 3,4, and 5 were computed by averaging the difference between the
predicted mean hourly demand and observed demand on curtailment days. The baseline model was
estimated using hourly observations on non-curtailment days alone. Impacts are calculated for each 15minute interval. The curtailment day loads are estimates is the same for each 15-minute interval in the
hour. The impacts are calculated separately for each observed 15-minute average. The average
precooling and rebound values were computed by averaging the differences between the observed and
predicted cooling loads in the three hours prior to and after the curtailment event respectively. Standard
errors are in parenthesis. The standard errors were computed by dividing the standard deviation obtained
from a t-test of the difference in means between predicted and observed loads with the number of
observations.
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Table 2: Heterogeneity in Response to SmartAC Program
Average Peak
Load on noncurtailment days
Panel A: Technology
PCT Group

2.41

Switch Group

1.83

Panel B: Classification by Load
Size
1st Quartile

Average Change in Consumption (KWh)
During
After
Before Event
Event
Event

0.190
(0.001)
0.090
(0.000)

-0.370
(0.001)
-0.310
(0.001)

0.273
(0.001)
0.140
(0.001)

0.68

0.069
(0.032)

-0.150
(0.005)

0.090
(0.029)

2nd Quartile

1.83

0.114
(0.001)

-0.261
(0.005)

0.073
(0.002)

3rd Quartile

2.56

0.150
(0.003)

-0.470
(0.006)

0.119
(0.005)

4th Quartile

2.67

0.318
(0.020)

-0.570
(0.007)

0.191
(0.001)

Notes: Panel A reports the load impact response by technology type and panel B reports the load impact response by
load size in KWh. The reported values are mean values averaged over time and specific class. Standard errors are in
parenthesis .
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Table 3: Average Precooling, Load Response and Rebound on Proxy days
Date
11-Jul
18-Jul
19-Jul
25-Jul
31-Jul
2-Aug
27-Aug
29-Aug

Change in Consumption (Kwh/h)
Before Event
During Event
After Event
0.06
-0.01
0.00
0.01
-0.01
0.00
-0.03
-0.03
0.07
-0.06
-0.01
-0.05
-0.04
0.00
-0.03
0.07
0.00
-0.02
0.00
-0.01
0.00
0.04
0.11
0.00

Notes: Proxy event days are defined as days with similar temperature profile as the
curtailment days; and also fall within a few days of the curtailment days (1 or 2 days before
or after) the curtailment days that is not a weekend, public holiday, past curtailment day.
Model results are calculated for all the curtailment days, however, diagnostics are calculated
only for the set of proxy event days.
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Table 6: Net Savings with and without Precooling and Rebound

Date
12-Jul
17-Jul
23-Jul
26-Jul
27-Jul
1-Aug
9-Aug
10-Aug
21-Aug
22-Aug
28-Aug
30-Aug
31-Aug
Sum

Per Unit Event Savings
lbs of
KWh
$
CO2e
(A)
(B)
(C )
1.156
0.724
0.031
0.140
0.730
0.133
2.884
2.866
1.379
0.600
3.219
0.237
0.564
2.919
0.281
2.476
3.053
1.065
0.864
1.604
0.388
1.283
2.731
0.589
2.795
4.692
1.283
2.398
3.855
0.855
2.224
3.855
1.247
2.084
4.747
0.923
3.750
5.986
1.709
23.218
41.040
10.12

Per Unit Net Savings
KWh
(D)
1.036
0.290
1.654
0.150
0.114
1.636
0.635
0.263
1.835
1.378
1.354
0.764
2.670
13.798

Conservation
Cost
$
lbs of CO2e
($/MWh)
(E)
(F)
(G)
0.339
-0.053
7.24
0.154
0.109
-2.65
1.343
0.832
17.14
0.812
0.033
23.3+2
0.547
0.072
35.14
1.908
0.667
30.65
1.564
0.279
11.85
1.143
0.106
49.62
3.771
0.816
53.83
1.952
0.360
24.17
2456
0.698
58.23
2.676
0.323
61.11
4.957
1.200
46.00
23.622
5.442

Notes: Columns A and B report the savings over the curtailment period in KWh and Dollar values respectively.
Column B is computed by multiplying KWh savings by the number of hours and the total KW signed up to the
program as at August 31 2007 (number of units multiplied by the tonnage per unit) as well as Net Marginal Price at
that particular hour in $/MWh. Columns D and E report the savings accounting for the precooling and rebound
effects in KWh and dollars respectively. Column D was computed by subtracting the amount of precooling and
snapback from total reduction during the curtailment period. Column E was computed the same way as Column B,
however the net reduction was used. Columns C and F were computed by multiplying hourly change in consumption
with hourly emission factors as reported in literature. Column G is the marginal cost of generation for the changes in
off-peak consumption.
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Online Appendix
for
The Mitigating Effect of Strategic Behavior on the Net Benefits of a Direct Load
Control Program
Corey Lang and Edson Okwelum
(Not for publication)

This appendix provides results that supplement, but are not critical to the analysis in
the main paper.

Figures A1-A and A1-B represents plots of precooling over time and
temperature respectively. The vertical lines are the average precooling in both graphs.
Both figures imply that precooling increases over time and higher temperatures
Figure A2 presents a plot of precooling as function of temperature and date on
which curtailment event was called. The vertical line represents daily average
temperature while the horizontal axis represents the date on which a particular
curtailment corresponding to that average temperature was called. The size of the balls
reflects the amount of precooling in KWh/h. The figure reflects the relationship
between amount of precooling, average daily temperature and possible effect of
learning by participating households.
Figure A3 is a density plot of change in consumption from a Monte Carlo
exercise in which we use each non-curtailment day as a proxy event day. We then
estimate our model without that day, predict the consumption for that proxy event day
and compute the change in consumption between the observed and predicted loads.
We repeat for these for all non curtailment days and plot the density in A3.
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Figure A4-1 &2 plots both the observed load and estimated load on the same
axes for a single participating unit on a typical curtailment day. The dashed red lines
represent the estimated load profile while the continuous blue line is the observed load
profile for a single unit. The vertical red lines are the points at which the curtailment
event started and stopped respectively.
Figure A5 is a density plot of load with the dashed vertical lines representing
the quartile positions.
Figure A6 is a plot of deviation (the difference between predicted and observed
loads) one day before and one day after curtailment event.
Figure A7 is a plot of (the difference between predicted and observed loads)
Table 1-A is the hourly change in consumption on all curtailment days studied.
The values were computed by subtracting the 15 minute observed load from the 15
minute estimated load. While the baseline model was estimated using hourly
observations, the change in consumption was however calculated for each 15-minute
interval. The estimated cooling load is the same for each 15-minute interval within
each hour. All colored values are significant except on July 12.
Typical Curtailment Event Initiation and Process
Typical process for a control event involves the following steps:


The evaluators decide what day and time period should be used for the
curtailment event based on the weather forecast, and the mix of curtailment
and non-curtailment days that were already experienced.



If the evaluators call the curtailment event, they alternate the two smart
thermostat
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subgroups within the special monitoring group that received the population
treatment and the alternative treatment. If the event is called by PG&E -- i.e.,
the curtailment applies to all SmartAC participants and not just those in the
special monitoring group -- then the entire special monitoring group received
the population treatment.


The day prior to the curtailment event, the evaluators submit these instructions
to the PG&E SmartAC Program staff who then relay them to Cannon
Technologies which manages the Yukon system that allows the curtailment
events to be initiated.



Third party technology solution provider writes a computer program that will
implement the control instructions requested by the evaluators. These
programs are tested.



PG&E‘s Transmission and Operations staff receive the evaluator instructions
and initiate the curtailment events.

Sampling Design and Stratification
Table 2-A shows the sample design. Sampling for the Special Monitoring Group was
stratified into 8 strata on the basis of device type, tons of air conditioning per
household and the presence or absence of multiple AC units, as well as other
demographic factors.
Description of Curtailment Events Involving the SmartAC Monitoring Group
(SMG)
During the period June 07-October 07, PG&E initiated 13 curtailment events
affecting Program participants from the SMG. Of these 13 events, all the program
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participants were exposed to two of the curtailment events compared to the 13 that the
SMG was exposed to: one in July 2007 and another in September 2007. All these
curtailment events were initiated by PG&E. Households with smart thermostats were
further divided into two subgroups-A & B based on the type of curtailment day and
type of treatment received on that date. On the basis of the type treatment, three ―Day
Types‖ are recognized: Day Type 0, Day Type 1 & Day Type 2. Day type 0 is used to
describe curtailment day in which all the smart thermostats received the same type of
treatment. On such days, PG&E set back the thermostat one degree every other hour.
We refer to this as the ―population treatment‖. ―Day Type 1‖ refers to curtailment days
when subgroup A received the population treatment and subgroup B received the
setback treatment. The setback treatment involved setting back the thermostat one
degree every hour for four hours. Day Type = 2 refers to a day when subgroup B
received the population treatment and subgroup A received the setback treatment.
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Figure A1-A: Aggregate precooling over Time
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Notes: Vertical axis is the average precooling on curtailment days for all participating units
obtained by averaging the difference between the observed 15 minute load demand and
predicted 15 minute load estimate. The horizontal axis plots the specific curtailment day.

Figure A1-B: Aggregate Precooling across Daily Average Temperature
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Notes: This figure also plots average precooling on the vertical axis; however, the horizontal axis
denotes average daily temperature on curtailment days.
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Figure A2: Aggregate precooling with respect to time and temperature
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Notes: The size of the bubbles represents the size of the average precooling on a specific
date and average temperature value on that curtailment day.
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Figure A3: Monte Carlo Estimate of Precooling using Non-Curtailment Days
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Figure A4-1: Curtailment Day Observed Load vs. Estimated Load
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Figure A4-2: Curtailment day Observed Vs. Estimated LoadIndividual
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Figure A5: Density of Load Distribution with Quartiles
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Figure A6: Deviation of Predicted from Observed Load
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Figure A7: Deviation of Predicted Load from Observed Load
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Table 7-A Hourly Changes in Consumption on Curtailment Days
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Table2-A: Sample Design for EM&V Special Monitoring Group
Total Tons Multiple AC
Program
Design
Type of
From All Units on Site Participants as Sample
Stratum
Device
Units
(1=Yes)
of 06/11/2007
Size
1
PCT
<4
0
483
93
2
PCT
<4
1
6
3
3
PCT
>=4
0
148
37
4
PCT
>=4
1
34
17
5
Switch
<4
0
1,404
77
6
Switch
<4
1
21
5
7
Switch
>=4
0
637
54
8
Switch
>=4
1
123
17
Total
2,856
303
Notes: Source-EMA,2008

.
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Table3-A: Average Precooling, Load Impact Response & Rebound During
Curtailment Days by all Units
Date
12-Jul
17-Jul
23-Jul
26-Jul
27-Jul
1-Aug
9-Aug
10-Aug
21-Aug
22-Aug
28-Aug
30-Aug
31-Aug
Mean

Average Daily
Temperature (oF)
71
73
81
74
76
77
75
78
84
83
84
87
88

Average Change in Consumption (KWh/h)
Before
Event
0.04
-0.04
0.32
0.04
0.03
0.11
0.06
0.10
0.22
0.16
0.14
0.31
0.22
0.13

During Event
-0.02
-0.07
-0.58
-0.13
-0.15
-0.58
-0.21
-0.32
-0.56
-0.37
-0.55
-0.51
-0.75
-0.41

After
Event
0.02
0.06
0.07
0.11
0.12
0.17
0.01
0.24
0.10
0.18
0.25
0.11
0.13
0.12

Notes: The values in columns 3,4, and 5 were computed by averaging the difference between
the predicted mean hourly demand and observed demand on curtailment days. The baseline
model was estimated using hourly observations on non-curtailment days alone. Impacts are
calculated for each 15-minute interval. The curtailment day loads are estimates is the same for
each 15-minute interval in the hour. The impacts are calculated separately for each observed
15-minute average. The average precooling and rebound values were computed by averaging
the differences between the observed and predicted cooling loads in the three hours prior to and
after the curtailment event respectively.
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Table 4-A: Net Environmental Impacts of SmartAC Program (SO2)
Average Emission (Reductions)/Increases (metric tons of SO2e)
Date
12-Jul
17-Jul
23-Jul
26-Jul
27-Jul
1-Aug
9-Aug
10-Aug
21-Aug
22-Aug
28-Aug
30-Aug
31-Aug

Before Event
0.00
(0.60)
1.91
0.22
0.16
0.60
0.33
0.55
1.20
0.88
0.82
1.49
1.11

During Event
-1.39
-0.11
-5.14
-0.61
-0.72
-3.17
-1.07
-1.64
-3.64
-3.12
-3.61
-2.73
-4.92

After Event
0.18
0.21
0.38
0.49
0.54
0.76
0.04
1.08
0.55
0.99
0.66
0.71
0.71

Net Effect
-1.21
-0.50
-2.85
0.10
-0.01
-1.80
-0.70
-0.01
-1.89
-1.26
-2.13
-0.52
-3.10

Mean

0.67

-2.45

0.56

-1.22

Notes: The values in columns 3,4, and 5 were computed by multiplying the hourly changes in
consumption with hourly marginal emissions intensities per KWh in the Western Interconnection using
SO2 lbs/MWh values in Kochen and Mansur 2012. The values in the last column is the sum of values in
columns 3,4, and 5 respectively. There were 8,843 cooling units enrolled in the program. The average ton
per unit was 3.3 and these were then converted to KW by multiplying with a factor 3.517
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Table 5-A: Effect Sequence of Curtailment Days
Variables
Estimates
0.009***
CUMMS+3Hrs before Event
(0.0001)
0.019***
CUMMS+2Hrs before Event
(0.0004)
0.026***
CUMMS+1Hr before Event
(0.0001)
-0.014***
CUMMS*Curtailment Period
(0.0005)
0.107***
CUMMS+1Hr After Event
(0.0005)
0.013***
CUMMS+2Hrs After Event
(0.0006)
CUMMS+3Hrs After Event
0.009***
(0.0005)
15-Minute Fes
Yes
Notes: *,**,***-Stars indicate significance effect at 0.10,0.05 and 0.01 levels
respectively. The dependent variable is the average 15-minute interval cooling
demand (kW) with the same explanatory variables as those used in the main
specification. However, the regressions were estimated using GLS estimator and
Huber-White robust standard error. The estimates presented here from an
aggregate model.
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Fuel Economy and Vehicle Safety: Selection on Moral Hazard and
Estimates of External Accident Costs
By
Edson Okwelum, Jim Opaluch and Corey Lang
Department of Environmental and Natural Resource Economics
University of Rhode Island
June 4, 2014

Abstract

A long held view is that fuel economy standards, designed to reduce emissions from
vehicles have led to changes in fleet weight distribution leading to increased accident
fatalities. It is sometimes argued that estimates of the cost of a heavier fleet on accident
costs could be biased by selection on moral hazard where drivers of heavier vehicles get
into deadlier accidents. However, previous empirical research has not accounted for the
effect of selection on moral hazard in estimates of accident costs. This paper provides
empirical estimates of the effect of changes in fleet weight distribution on vehicle safety
due to regulatory constraints. We propose a two-step simulated maximum likelihood
estimation strategy to identify and account for selection on moral hazard and unobserved
heterogeneity. We find significance evidence of selection on moral hazard effects
resulting in downward bias in estimates of the external costs of accident.

Keywords: Moral Hazard, CAFE, Externality, Selection, SML estimation
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Introduction
In a bid to promote efficiency improvements and reduce competitive impacts
across the vehicle fleet, the corporate average fuel economy standards (CAFE) set less
stringent targets for larger/heavier vehicles. Two of the most important design
parameters that help determine vehicle‘s fuel economy and CO2 emissions are weight
and performance. Between the late 1970s and 1988, dramatic improvements in fuel
economy were accompanied by declines in vehicle weight. And in the two decades
between mid-1980s and mid 2000s, fuel economy rose while average fleet weight
increased to pre-CAFE levels due to technology innovations. Since 2005 however,
improvement in automotive technology has improved fuel economy and performance
while keeping weight constant and reducing emissions (EPA 2013). The result is a
heterogeneous fleet with conflicting implications for safety.
In motor crashes, the larger weights of the heavier vehicles offer more
protection to its occupants while imposing greater risks to occupants of the lighter
vehicles. Therefore the social costs of increasing vehicle weight include safety gains
by occupants of the heavier vehicle, the safety losses imposed on the struck vehicle,
pedestrians, bicyclists, motorcyclists, etc. However, some of the increased risks for
occupants who switch to lighter vehicles would be offset by the decreased risk for
individuals already in those vehicles (NRC 1992). If the fleet is made up of
predominantly lighter vehicles, then a greater percentage of crashes will be between
lighter vehicles, resulting in lower fatality rates than if the crashes were between a
heavy vehicle and lighter one. In addition, a lighter fleet will result in lower fatalities
in collision between vehicles and pedestrians, bicyclists, motorcyclists, etc. In
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contrast, if the fleet is predominantly heavy, then we would have higher fatality and
injury rates. In addition, given that it is now less costly for drivers of heavier vehicles
to be in accidents could induce them to change their risk profile and thus increase the
number of accidents. This problem is best formulated as a classic prisoner‘s dilemma
game where each individual reduces risk by increasing weight of her vehicle, but
doing so reduces safety to others. The Nash equilibrium will be vehicles that are
predominantly light and possibly reduce risk to occupants of other vehicles and
lowering of gas mileage.
This paper examines the safety effects of changing fleet weight distribution by
estimating how much injury risks would change if consumers purchased increasingly
heavier, larger, and less efficient vehicles rather than lighter vehicles given regulatory
constraints. The paper estimates both the risk of dying given a crash and the crash
frequencies of different vehicles in the fleet. We use a unique data set that combines
data from fatality analysis reporting system (FARS) and NASS18 General Estimates
Systems. The estimation strategy used corrects for selection bias due to moral hazard
problems. The two equations are estimated simultaneously using simulated maximum
likelihood without the need for exclusion restrictions (Green 2003, 2007). This
approach allows us to obtain estimates that are causal.
While there are several works looking at the effect of vehicle weight and size
on traffic costs, past empirical estimates have ignored the issue of selection on moral
hazard. Jacobsen 2013 finds that increasing the weight of a vehicle by 1000 pounds
increases the number of fatalities in other vehicles by 45% while reducing own

18

National Automotive Sampling System
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fatalities by 54%. Jacobsen adjusts for sample selection bias that may exist due to the
lack of reliable data on non-fatal crashes by linking driver riskiness to increased
fatalities from single vehicle crashes. Anderson and Auffhammer 2013 find a 4050%19 increase of risk on others of increasing own weight by 1000 pounds. They make
no specific assumption about selection bias, arguing that their unique data set and
multiple identification approach preclude selectivity. Though they include several
driver, vehicle and environmental risk factors.
Evans (2001) estimates both the protective and aggressive effects of increasing
weight by 1000 pounds of 40% and 42% respectively. He uses differences in the
number of occupants in the struck and striking vehicles to identify the effect of weight.
This strategy helps avoid a host of selection issues, since it allows weight to vary
holding all other attributes of the vehicle fixed. Kahane (2003) also finds estimates in
the order of -30% to 70% for the protective effect of increasing vehicle weight and
cautions that his estimates for the heavier vehicles may be biased due to driver
selection.
However, an important potential weakness in these approaches is the existence
of Peltzman-type moral hazard problems and endogeneity of vehicle choice. In the
presence of Peltzman-type moral hazard problems, drivers in heavier vehicles will find
it advantageous to change their behavior in ways that have opposite effect (Pederson
2003, Peltzman 197, Risa 1992, 1994). The change in their risk behavior results in

19

Anderson and Auffhammer notes that these are lower bounds, given that heavier vehicles are
involved in more collisions.
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their being involved in more fatal crashes20. Given these, it is more likely that
estimates of the causal effect of weight in literature are biased. In contrast, it is also
possible that safety conscious drivers may buy heavier vehicles and drive more
cautiously. Which of these effects dominates is an empirical question. There are two
challenges with correcting for selection on moral hazard issues. The first issue is
whether the incentive effect occurs at all. The second issue is whether the effect is
large enough to completely offset the reduction in the probability of injury such that
the number of injuries increases as the vehicle fleet becomes heavier and safer. Also
from a public policy perspective if increasing the weight of a vehicle increases the
probability of its being involved in collisions, then we might be interested in more
than the impact of heavier vehicles conditional on a crash occurring.
We make three main contributions in this paper. First, we provide empirical
evidence of effect of selection bias due to moral hazard in estimates of the effects of
heavier vehicles on traffic injury rates. Combining results from the theoretical
framework and empirical estimates, we develop simple qualitative tests to show
evidence of selection bias due to drivers of heavier vehicles involvement in more
fatal/serious injury accidents. We find that increasing the weight of any vehicle
increases the probability of it being the heavier vehicle in a collision and the
probability of it being involved in a fatal accident. The external costs translate to about
38 cents/gallon of gasoline. These values though larger, are comparable to values
obtained by Jacobsen (2013) and Anderson and Auffhammer (2013). The second
contribution of the paper is methodological. It features an application of bivariate
20

White (2004) and Anderson (2008) estimate that light trucks are 13% to 45% more likely to
experience multivehicle collisions than passenger cars.

68

random effects estimator in a count model (Riphahn et al 2003; Terza 2010; Green
2012).The third contribution relates to the use of the underlying estimates of the rates
of traffic injury in policy simulations.
The paper is related to several lines of literature. First is the large volume of
literature on impact of CAFE standards on traffic safety (NRC 1992, 2002). Much of
the debate has centered on the relationship between weight, fuel economy, vehicle
choice and safety (Li 2009; Crandall and Graham 1989; Noland 2004; 2005; Parry
2006; Small and Van Dender 2006; Khazzoom 2000). Another is the literature on
individual choice of activity on self protection, averting behavior and moral hazard in
traffic safety (Pedersen 2003; Blomquist 2004; Bolmquist, Miller and Levy 1996;
Avery, Heyman and Zeckhauser 2001; Ashenfelter and Greenstone 2002; Chestnut
2001; Li 2012 ;). The third area is the literature on the protective and aggressive
effects of vehicle weight on occupant safety (NRC 2002; Peltzman 1975; White 2004;
Gayer 2004; Evans 2001; Anderson 2008; Hultkrantz and Lindberg 2011; Jacobsen
2013; Anderson and Auffhammer 2013). This paper is most closely related to the
work of Jacobsen 2013, and Anderson and Auffhammer 2013. However, this work is
different from theirs in several respects. Unlike Jacobsen we use data from both fatal
and nonfatal accidents21. Our paper is also different from the two papers because we
account for selection bias arising from moral hazard through the correlation of
unobservables in the two dimensions of vehicle safety.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the
theoretical framework. Section III presents the data, while section IV describes the
21

Anderson and Auffhammer also use data on both fatal and nonfatal accidents, however, they do not
account for selection on moral hazard.

69

specification. Section V presents the results. Section VI performs policy experiments,
while section VII concludes.
Theoretical Background
The theoretical framework is an extension of the standard law and economics
of the choice of care model that accounts for a policy variable (Liao and White 2004;
Shavell 1979, 1982; Cummins et al 2001). Road transport is generally recognized to
be characterized by several externalities –accident, air pollution, congestion and other
externalities (Parry et al 2004, Elvik 1994, Newberry 1988). The severity of an
accident is influenced by speed and rate by traffic density. The effects of these two
factors tend to work in opposite directions, as increased traffic levels are often
associated with a reduction in average speed. The external effects arise anywhere the
risk faced by one driver depends on the actions of other drivers. The externality arises
from the fact that even a careful driver could be injured in an accident that is caused
by another driver who was careless. On the other hand, the actions of the careful driver
will lead to reduction of risks imposed on others. Defining externality as above makes
it easy to express accident externality as a function of the dimension of behavioral
choice that is faced by the agent. Generally, when externalities are present,
equilibrium behavior is inefficient and the overall level of actions taken by society to
prevent accidents will be inadequate.
We assume that accidents are bilateral, drivers maximize expected utility with
initial wealth wi, are risk averse with respect to effort, and dislike effort or care (ei).
The accident probability is denoted by  and it is a function of the vehicle miles
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travelled- vmt and care level of each driver. Hence we write the probability of accident
for driver i as

 i   i ei , vmt 
with the probability of accident falling with care (  e  0,  2 e 2  0 ). There are
'

two states of the world-the loss state with probability  and the no-loss state with
probability 1   . The utility function is written as

ui wi , ei 
The utility is twice differentiable. These priori assumptions about the functions are
quite common with models of traffic safety. First it is assumed that utility is increasing
and strictly concave function in wealth and that the drivers‘ marginal utility is strictly
decreasing in her effort to be careful. Where uw>0, ue<0, uee <0 and uww < 022. The
accident losses are assumed to be non-stochastic and consist of economic losses
represented by l, (medical bills, lost earnings, general damages). There are other losses
such as pain and suffering that are not fully covered and are represented by g.
Insurance is available at actuarially fair premiums and drivers are assumed to be fully
insured. Hence the premium is given as



 i  i l
The accident cost l is a function of several parameters which are differentiated
among drivers such as severity of the accident, i , accident environment, size of
family, etc. The severity in turn depends on several vehicle attributes such as weight

22

There are no restrictions on ueu
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of both involved vehicles, (mi,mj). Therefore we write
  i ,  j  with i  (mi , m j ),  j  (mi , m j ),  m  0,   m  0,  m  0,   m  0,
2

i

2

i

i

2

i

i

i

j

2
j

Increasing own vehicle weight reduces injuries in this struck vehicle, but at the same
time increases probability of injuries in other vehicles. Given the above assumptions,
driver i maximizes the expected utility given below:

EU i  1   ei , vmt wi   ei , vmt ( wi  i ( g  l )  pm m   i .

(1)

with respect to weight of car, m23, where pm is the price per unit weight of car ,m.
The first order condition with respect to m gives the optimal choice of weight for each
driver.

 

EU i

  ei , vmt  i l   i ( g )  p m  0
mi
mi
 mi


(2)

The sum in brackets is the marginal benefit of additional unit of expenditure on
weight. The last term is the marginal cost of incurring an additional expenditure on
weight. The above FOC shows that an increase in weight will result in lower injury
risk reflected in the lower losses. A risk adverse driver who maximizes utility will
choose the optimal vehicle weight (or other attribute) such that the marginal benefit of
having that extra weight just equals the increased cost of weight. This benefit could be
in the form of extra protection from an accident and the cost includes things like
additional expenditure on gasoline. If individual drivers choose m to maximize utility,
EU (m, e, w, l), the sufficient condition for optimality is
23

Another physical factor affecting injury likelihood is vehicle size, specifically the distance from the
front of a vehicle to its occupant compartment. The longer this is, the lower the forces on the occupants,
provided vehicle designers take advantage of the extra length. In theory the lighter weights of smaller
cars could be offset by increasing the sizes of their front ends, keeping weight down by using materials
like aluminum, plastic, or titanium. But this typically doesn‘t occur because such materials cost so
much.
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 2 EU i (m, e, w, l )
A
0
 m2

(3)

Differentiating equation 2 with respect to effort leads to clear conclusions about how a
risk adverse driver‘s effort changes with the optimal weight of a vehicle and
probability of accident. The results are intuitive behavioral responses. For example, an
increase in weight reduces the marginal effect of the driver‘s effort on the cost of an
accident, i.e. the safer the car, the lower the marginal benefit of effort and thus the
lower the driver‘s optimal effort level leading to higher accident rates. This is an
example of the rebound effect discussed in literature (Sorrel 2007). In effect, an
increase in weight could lead to an increase in accident frequency given that the higher
weight offers more protection. Anderson and Auffhammer (2013) argues that other
than the behavioral response, the physical features of heavier vehicles could also
induce them to be involved in more collisions.
General results from partial equilibrium suggest that the behavior represented
by the above FOC is inefficient. To fix ideas, compare this to a social optimum case in
which there are two types of drivers i and j. The first order condition leads to a
situation in which the driver i chooses the level of policy variable that is higher than
the social optimum such that her injury risk decreases and that of the second car
increases. The degree of concavity of u (w) and the convexity of the loss functions
ensures existence of interior solutions. The FOC for this is shown below:
EU i  EU j 
mi





 i
  j
 j 
i 
  
l
(.)  p m   
l
(.)  0
mi
mi 
mi
mi 






 Negative Externality 
 int ernal benefit 
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(4)

The first part of equation four is similar to the benefit part of equation 2.
Equation 4 is the standard outcome with negative externality and the solution is Pareto
optimal because the maximization of any social welfare function that is based on the
utility function of individual parties is Pareto optimal (Silberberg 1990). The second
part of the equation above is the negative externality that results from an increase in
mass of one vehicle relative to the other vehicle. The external cost component includes
all costs not taken into account by the driver himself. For example, loss of life and
health inflict pain and suffering on victims‘ relatives; these are not taken into account
by the driver (Jansson 1994).
If the risk is not fully internalized, the market will produce too large of the last
part of equation in brackets. For each choice of mj , there is a socially optimal choice
mi*(mj) and vice versa. The overall social optimum will occur where the equations
cross each other and we will have a Nash equilibrium such that mi>m*i and mj>m*j .
Without regulation of the fleet, the optimal action of i vehicle is to impose more risk
on j and j‘s best action is to take more averting behavior. The Nash equilibrium could
lead to too much risky behavior by one driver and subsequently more precautions
being taken by other drivers at the social optimum. Whether or not this produces less
risk than the social optimum is an econometric question. Also, rather than being
symmetric, the nature of the resulting externality is asymmetric. Generally, the
situation is such that we have one person (mi) imposing the risks and another taking
averting behavior (mj). The asymmetric nature of the equilibrium is significant in that,
we can regulate the actions of mi alone to restore the social optimum (Avery et al
2001).
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To obtain a tractable form for the estimation equation, we make the following
additional assumptions and simplifications. We can represent the external costs part of
the accident as
αFij ,

(5)

where α is the cost per unit of accident (statistical value of life or statistical value of
injury), and Fij is the number of fatalities or serious injuries in the struck vehicle in a
crash with vehicle j. Fij is attributable to several causal factors which we will discuss
later. We will also make assumptions about the general form of Fij, the distribution of
fatality or injury states. If X denote the causal factors determining Fij, then we have





 Fij X  f (x)

(6)

where f(x) is some regression function of the causal factors.
Data
The paper uses several datasets for the analysis. The main datasets are census
of all fatal accidents (FARS) and the National Automotive Sampling System General
Estimates
System (NASS-GES) covering the period 2008 through 2012.The paper also uses data
on the number of registered vehicles in each state by type and model from Polk NVPP
as well as number of miles driven by each vehicle class from the Federal Highway
Performance Monitoring System. We also include information on state level
demographic attributes, weather variables and other macroeconomic variables for the
analysis.
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Accident Data
The accident data are from several sources. FARS and NASS GES provide
data on vehicles involved in crashes. Vehicles involved in crashes are grouped into
three different classes based on severity of injury: fatal crashes, injury crashes, and
property damage only (PDO) crashes. Approximately 10 million passenger vehicles
per year were involved in police reported motor vehicle crashes between 2008 and
2012. This average figure reflects a crash involvement rate of over nineteen passenger
vehicles per minute for the years covered in this paper. Since the GES observations are
from a sampling survey, they therefore have a sampling weight. The combined data
for this study contained 150,633 fatal involvements and 263,749 unweighted GES
accidents, when weighted, results in an estimated 27,191,919 crash involvements.
A closer look at the data from FARS and GES reveals that light duty trucks
(SUVs, Pickup Trucks and Minivans) crash involvement rate in fatal accidents was
1.82 (0.25024 ) while for passenger cars was 1.41(0.18). Involvement rate of passenger
vehicles in injury accidents over the sample period was 112 (9.981) while for light
duty trucks were 102 (9.718). Looking only at accidents classified as PDO, passenger
car rates over the same period was 255 (7.705) and the values for light duty trucks was
254 (14.35). It is also worth noting that over the same period, the number of registered
SUVs and trucks increased by over 70%.
NASS GES contains detailed information on a representative sample of
thousands of property damage/no injuries, serious injury, and fatal crashes. Field

24

The involvement rate values reported are rates per 100 million vmt. The values in parentheses are
the standard errors.
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research teams located at Primary Sampling Units (PSU's) across the country study
about 50,000 crashes a year involving passenger cars, light trucks, vans, and utility
vehicles. The NASS GES relies on a select sample of police accident reports (PARs)
from 400 police jurisdictions within 60 geographic areas (PSUs). Data from twovehicle crashes in which occupants were either killed or seriously injured were
extracted from the dataset. The dataset was further restricted to vehicles with model
years later than 1979. Using the NASS vehicle body type classification, all vehicles in
the dataset were grouped into four classes- passenger cars, vans, SUVs and pickup
trucks. There were 417,510 observations satisfying the above criteria of which 86, 567
observations were single-vehicle crashes and 265,63325 observations were two-vehicle
crashes. The remaining 74,310 observations are crashes in which multiple vehicles
were involved and were subsequently dropped. Since each two-vehicle crash contains
two vehicles- the ―own vehicle‖ and the ―other vehicle‖, care was taken not to double
count observations by assigning a group identification number based on accident case
number, year of accident and vehicle number in the NASS GES data. The model
estimation was based on only those observations for which all the independent
variables were not missing. We also dropped accidents in which school buses,
emergency and police cars were involved.
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the accident data. Columns 1,2 and 3
report statistics for the entire two vehicle collision dataset. The mean vehicle weight is
3,38826 pounds with average age of 2000. The number of fatalities per accident is
0.02612 with standard error of 6.5, while the number of serious injuries per accident is
25
26

That comes to about 11,538 accidents after data cleaning
The ratio of ―other‖ vehicle weight to ―own‖ vehicle weight is 1.01
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0.746 with standard error of 36.7. In our sample, alcohol is involved in 6.1% of all two
vehicle crashes. In all two-vehicle crashes, 92% of the drivers had some form of
restraint such as seat belt.
Vehicle Miles Driven and Car Registration Data
Vehicle registration data are compiled by R. L. Polk & Company in the
National Vehicle Population Profile (NVPP). State level data on vehicle miles
travelled by vehicle class were obtained from the highway statistics series of the
Office of Highway Policy information from the department of Transportation. The
data are broken down by state, vehicle type (passenger car, vans, SUV, pickups and
other pickup types), and type of road (rural or urban). Since the data contain separate
information on SUVs, vans, pickups and passenger cars at the state levels, I am able to
test whether crash frequencies for the different injury severity levels vary across
vehicle class types. The data cover the period 2008 to 2012 for all states in the US.
Closely related to the vehicle miles travelled data is the number of registered vehicles
by vehicle type at the state level and the public road length by state in miles. These
were also obtained from highway statistics series of the Department of Transportation.
Demographic Characteristics
Additional information on state level demographic characteristics like per
capita alcohol consumption, unemployment rate, population data, and investment on
road covering the period 2008 to 2012 were also obtained from several sources. The
per capital alcohol consumption by state was obtained from surveillance report on
1977–2012 apparent per capita alcohol consumption in the United States published
annually by National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA). The data
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are based on alcoholic beverages sales data. The population data and unemployment
rate were obtained from the statistical abstracts of the US published by the US Census
Bureau.
Econometric Model
The number of fatally or seriously injured occupants, Fij, in the struck vehicle
is a count variable and nonnegative. Therefore we are inclined to use count models for
our estimation. However, we are faced with two main challenges. First crash severity,
a function of the weight of the two vehicles and their relative velocities at the point of
impact is not observed. It reflects the influence of the mass of both vehicles and the
behavior of both drivers27. And there are several interrelated human factors, which are
not easily quantifiable, but are however related to vehicle weight and crash severity. In
effect, unobserved factors related to weight and crash severity may be correlated with
the error terms thereby introducing endogeneity. Second, from the derived external
cost of accident section 2, one obtains that drivers of heavier vehicles are induced to
drive more dangerously given that it is now less costly for drivers to be in an accident.
Drivers will expend fewer resources to avoid being in an accident, and thus the
number of accidents will increase. This is the well known moral hazard effect
discussed by Peltzman (1975). Selection on moral hazard implies that drivers of
heavier vehicles are more likely to be involved in more fatal accidents in which
occupants of other vehicle are killed or seriously injured. In effect, drivers of heavier
vehicles could be induced to drive more dangerously because of several factors that

27

Several approaches have been used to control for crash severity. See Toy and Hammit for the various
authors researchers have used to control for crash severity.
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are not clear28. If drivers of heavier vehicles in our sample are on average more likely
to be involved in more severe crashes, then selection bias would be a problem.
To account for unobserved driver effects, while also correcting for possible
selection on moral hazard, we use a two-step procedure similar to that developed by
Terza Nelsusan (1994). In the first stage, we estimate the probability of being involved
in an accident. These estimates are then plugged into the second stage negative
binomial regression estimates of the injury severity equation.
The selection model is



PAccits  1 | wi    wi,  i



(7a)

w'  vmt, lts , X is , YEAR 2003  YEAR 2012
where Ф is a standard normal distribution function. But we do not require it to be
normal. Accist is number of crashes in state s by vehicle type i at time t29, vmt is the
vehicle miles travelled, lts30 is the traffic density at time t in state s, Xits represents all
other covariates such as weight of the vehicles, per capita alcohol consumption, share
of population using seat belts, several variables representing population distribution,
rural and urban speed restrictions, measures for weather variables (number of days
with snowfall greater than 1and 5 inch, number of days with temperature lower than
0oF, number of days with precipitation greater than 5 inches), control for census
division, and investment in road network.

28

It is also possible that safety conscious drivers could pick heavier vehicles because they are safer, in
part explaining the reduction in fatality or injury rates of such vehicles.
29
It can also represent 1 if the vehicle was involved in a fatal crash and 0 otherwise, which is the well
known Probit selection model. We tried both specifications and the results are similar.
30
The traffic density is defined as the ratio of VMT over length of public road.
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We specify the number of fatalities or serious injuries in each vehicle as a
function of the driver characteristics, the characteristics of the two vehicles, the
environment in which the accident took place, and other covariates of interest. The
model is:









 Fij m1 , m2 ,  i  exp   X i'    i ,  i ~ 0,1

(7b)

where Xi =

m1 , m2 , restrain1 , Airbag, SPDL, NoOccupants1 , Othersi 
The dependent (Fij) variable is the number of occupant injuries or fatalities in the
struck vehicle. m1, m2 denote the curb weight of the struck and striking vehicles
respectively, Restraint is a dummy indicating whether the driver of the struck vehicle
properly used a seat belt and Airbag is also a dummy indicating whether a driver-side
air bag was deployed, SPDL denotes the speed limit on the accident location. Others
include all other independent variables like location of accident (rural or urban road),
dummies indicating if the driver is a male and greater than 65 years, dummy for
gender of the driver, dummy if the driver is less than 21, dummies for if alcohol and
drug was involved. A series of three indicator variables is used to capture the impact
of crash configuration on the injury risk, year and state effects. εi, the unobserved
heterogeneity, is normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation ζ; and in
our framework this includes distance from a hospital, mental state of the driver that
day, did the driver surfer heart condition, etc. Given the presence of the unobserved
heterogeneity in equation 7b, Green (1998, 2008) and Cameron and Trivedi (1990,
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1998, 2005) show that the right hand side of equation 7b is Negative Binomial (NB)
distributed.
Writing the models in this form allows us to operationalize the selection
problem through the correlation of the ε and μ error terms. The unobservables, ε and μ
are assumed jointly normally distributed, i.e.

 i , i  ~ N 0,0, 2 , 2 ,  

(7c)

Where  2 and  2 are the variances of the ε and μ respectively, ρ is the
correlation between the error terms. Conditional on selection, the dependent variable is
unlikely to be either Poisson or NB distributed which would allow estimation through
usual methods. Drawing on the results of Terza (1995, 1998) and Green 2008, the
likelihood function for the full model is equivalent to the joint density function for the
observed data. The full set of parameters (ζε ζμ β, γ and ρ) can be estimated through a
single step simultaneously using full information maximum likelihood (FIML) or
simulated maximum likelihood (SML) procedures without the need for exclusion
restrictions (Ripham et al 2003, Green 2008). We proceed by forming the loglikelihood from the joint density of the selection model (6a) and injury severity (6b) as
PFij | Acc  f ( Acc ) .

Following Green (1997, 2008), the log-likelihood function is

estimated with the use of a SML.
Results
Model Performance
As a way of evaluating the preference of the selection model over the simple
Poisson or NB specifications, we first estimated both models and then conduct
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hypothesis tests based on the estimated correlation parameter, ρ, as well as a
likelihood ratio test. Tables 2 and 4 present the regression estimates for the models
without selection and with selection respectively. The results suggest that there
appears to be selection effects in the estimates, as shown by different coefficients in
the conditional model. A Wald test for the existence of selection effect against a null
hypothesis that the correlation coefficient is zero, i.e. H0: ρ=0 is rejected. The Wald
test produces a test statistic of (−100.024)2 = 50.012 (with a p value of 0.000), which
is larger than the critical value of 1.96 for a standard normal, leading to the rejection
of the null hypothesis. A likelihood ratio test was computed as the difference between
the log-likelihood for the full model with selection and log-likelihood for the model
without selection effect (when ρ equals zero). The result is

LR  2 4,898.88   260.802  (4,803.801)  331.446
and the hypothesis is also rejected.
This value leads us to reject the simple Poisson or NB model while accepting
the bivariate model that allows significant correlations across the two dimensions of
the vehicle safety. The test statistics confirm the high statistical significance of the
structural parameters ζε,, ζμ and ρ. The negative sign on the correlation coefficient
indicates that the latent factors which decrease the severity of injury in two vehicle
crashes increase the probability of being involved in an accident, a situation that is
consistent with the selection bias. The model with correlated counts is deemed the
most appropriate one to use in this situation and is the basis for the policy simulations
in a later section.
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Further, we also investigated the fit for the data generating process for the two
count variables. Figures 1A and 1B show that the NB model is a better fit for the data
generating processes. Figure 1A represents the mean-variance relationship for the
accident frequency model while Figure 1B is the variance relationship for the severity
model. The Poisson and Negative Binomial (NB) models both do a good job of
predicting fatal accidents at low mean values. However, the Poisson model does not
do a good job at mean values above 0.2 compared to the NB model. Figure 2 is plot of
predicted probability of being involved in a fatal accident at different weight classes.
The figure suggests that as the weight increases, the probability of being involved in a
fatal accident increases. The following sections discuss the results from the first stage
and the second stages as well as policy simulations.
Selection Model
Table 3 reports the first-stage regression results, i.e. regressing the whether or
not a vehicle was involved in an accident in a state or not against the weight of the
vehicle, vehicle miles travelled and other covariates. The linear probability estimates
and the Probit estimates indicate that vehicles which are heavier by an average of 1000
pounds are 0.1-0.15 more likely to be involved in more fatal or serious injury
accidents given their exposure, age, and driver attributes, etc. The coefficient of
vehicle miles travelled and the share of light trucks are significant and positive
suggesting that increasing the distance travelled increases the probability of being
involved in an accident. The positive sign on the weight coefficients are in line with
prior estimates of heavier vehicles being involved in more crashes elsewhere
(Anderson 2008, White 2004, and Gayer 2004).
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Fatalities in Two-Vehicle Crashes
Table 431 presents results of the second stage regression estimates of bivariate
model for number of fatalities in struck vehicle against covariates of interest and other
confounding attributes. The key explanatory variables are the curb weights of the
struck (m1) and striking (m2) vehicles. The two weight variables are in 1000 units so
that their coefficients measure the factor change in expected number of fatalities in the
struck vehicle when the weight of struck or striking vehicle changes by 1000 pounds
in line with earlier studies. The coefficients on the struck and striking vehicles have
the predicted signs. Other covariates include speed limit at the point where the
accident occurred, age of the driver, number of occupants in the struck vehicle,
dummies to indicate whether or not the driver was wearing seat belt, dummies to
indicate the role drug or alcohol played in the accident. It also includes state by year
fixed effects and model year fixed effects.
Columns 2 and 3 report the second stage results along with the model without
selection for comparison in the first column. Our preferred model is column three,
estimated through simulated maximum likelihood method. The results in Column 2,
were obtained using a control function method and are in line with those obtained
through the preferred method. Column 3 results indicate that increasing the weight of
the striking vehicle by 1000 pounds increases the expected number of fatalities by a
statistically significant factor of 1.643 (t=7.1). This is equivalent to an increase of
64.3% over our mean number of fatalities. Increasing the weight of the struck vehicle

31

Table 2 presents the results of the Negative Binomial regression estimates of the number of fatalities
in the struck vehicle against covariates of interest. The values for the marginal effects are similar and
consistent to those obtained by Anderson and Auffhammer (2013). The results indicate that increasing
the weight of the striking vehicle increases the expected number of fatalities by about 40-45%.
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reduces the expected number of fatalities in the struck vehicle by a mere 21.8%. These
results, though similar to those obtained by Anderson and Auffhammer (2013) and
Jacobsen (2013), with the results from the control function and SML approaches being
larger. The first column results are similar to those obtained by Anderson and
Auffhammer (2013) and Jacobsen (2013). The coefficient on curb weight of striking
vehicle implies that a 1000 pound increases in its weight, increases the expected
number of fatalities in the struck vehicle by a statistically significant factor of 1.42
with t value of 5.25. Across all the specifications, increasing the weight of the striking
vehicle by 1000 pounds increases the expected number of fatalities in the struck
vehicle by about 50-64%, while increasing the curb weight of the struck vehicle by the
same amount results in a decrease in the expected number of fatalities by about 2126%.
Serious Injury in Two-Vehicle collisions
Table 4 reports the results from second stage regression estimates as well as
the regression without selection for comparison. The results reported are for only SML
approach. The dependent variable in this case is the number of seriously injured
occupants in the struck vehicle. Similarly we conduct Wald and likelihood ratio tests
for the presence of selection effects and we reject the null hypothesis null hypothesis
that ρ equals zero. Based on these tests, there does appear to be selection problem and
the coefficients do change somewhat in the conditional model.
The predicted sign for the struck vehicles are negative again since increasing
the weight of the struck vehicle will reduce the incidence of serious injuries in the
vehicle. Similarly, the sign of weight for the striking vehicle is positive. Increasing the
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weight of the striking by a 1000 pound will lead to an increase in the expected number
of seriously injured occupants by a statistically significant factor of 1.23. This is
equivalent to a 23% increase in the expected number of serious injuries in the struck
vehicle. While increasing the weight of the struck vehicle will decrease the expected
number of occupant injuries by 0.84 with a t-value of 8.28. This is equivalent to a
decrease in the expected number of seriously injured occupants by about 18%.
Alternative Specifications
Table 5 presents the results of alternative specification in which we replace the
weight of the two vehicles with a new explanatory variable that depicts difference in
weights. The difference in weights is defined as ratio of weight of the struck vehicle to
that of the striking vehicle. The coefficient of the ratio of weights is more difficult to
interpret. The coefficient is negative and significant at the 1% level. The coefficient of
mass ratio is -1. 460 with a t value of 7.87.
Moral Hazard and Falsification Tests
We will discuss the moral hazard issues and falsification (Keuzenkamp and
Magnus 1995; Buck and Lady 2005) together because the issue of identification of the
parameters is strongly linked to the assemblage of data and the hypothesis to be tested:
existence or absence of moral hazard. We employ a largely qualitative procedure to
test for existence of moral hazard presented by the econometric model. The emphasis
here is placed less on the quantitative measure, but rather on the sign partials of the
risk factor (weight) in the two equations. This approach allows the hypothesis to be
falsified regardless of identification. The approach to estimation of the model
parameters provide us with a unique opportunity to in-principle test for behavioral
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adaptation does take place. The intuition behind the test is that if weight has opposite
signed partials in the two equations (probability of accident and probability of injury
given and accident), it is reasonable to infer that behavioral adaptation will take place.
Since weight reduces the probability of occupant injuries, then if behavioral adaptation
occurs, then the accident frequency will increase. Therefore, the differently signed
partial effects of weight of the struck vehicle in the two stages of the estimation
procedure (probability of accident and probability of occupant injury given that an
accident has occurred) is a manifestation of moral hazard effects.
This reasoning is in line with Fridstrom 1999 and Peltzman 1975, who
hypothesized that whenever an accident risk factor has differently signed partial
effects in the accident frequency and occupant injury severity equations, that risk
factor is subject to risk compensation. These two tests provide weak support for our
selection on moral hazard hypothesis.
Next we discuss results of the falsification tests. If drivers of heavier vehicles
dot not involve in more fatal accidents, then one should not see any additional effect
of increased weight on injuries and fatalities on motorcyclists, bicyclist and pedestrian.
If we do find a statistically significant coefficient, then this is an indication that drivers
do indulge in Peltzman type behavioral response, by exposing non occupants of
vehicles to higher risk. To do this, we estimate another model for crashes between a
vehicle and pedestrian, bicyclist and compare the coefficients. The results for the
model are reported in Table 7. The coefficient of increasing the weight of vehicle is
highly significant with a t-value of 10.23
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Policy Simulations
The conceptual framework and econometric specification is able to predict
qualitatively and quantitatively how the weight of a vehicle affects the fatalities and
injuries in two vehicle crashes. Using the estimates from the model, one can simulate
the responsiveness to a policy change that results in the change in weight distribution
of the fleet. That is we can estimate the net effects of the safety gains to occupants of
the heavier vehicle and safety losses that the increased weight imposes on the
occupants of the struck vehicle. The model allows us to simulate how individual risks
changes if they switch from driving a heavier vehicle to a lighter vehicle. For example,
if a policy creates the incentives for households to switch to a heavier vehicle then
weighted average risk of the heavier drivers will change because their probability of
being involved in accidents would change to that of the heavier drivers. The intuition
being that factors such age and number of people in a household can interact with
vehicle choices.
Expected Externality Cost
The econometric results suggest that the expected accident cost is affected by
both the probability of being the heavier vehicle in a collision and the expected weight
difference in a two vehicle collision. Increasing the weight of vehicle increases both of
these. To explore the causal effect of weight on fatalities and serious injuries as well
as their distribution, we randomly draw a vehicle with weight mi and estimate the
marginal effect of adding 1000 pounds of weight to the striking vehicle. Then estimate
the probability of it being the heavier /lighter vehicle. From equation 4, we see that the
net costs are proportional to
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and is a function of the weight of the two vehicles. However, the results show that the
net costs depend on whether the vehicle is the heavier or lighter one in a two vehicle
collision. The probability of being the heavier or lighter vehicle is computed as the
proportion of all the vehicles in the sample that are heavier or lighter than the
randomly selected vehicle. The net cost is estimated as the expected cost of the vehicle
being the lighter one in a collision and of it being the heavier vehicle (Hultkrantz and
Lindberg 2011). The external cost is defined as:
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Using the actual weight data from accident reports, we compute the estimated
change in fatalities and serious injuries given the change in the weight distribution of
the US light duty vehicle fleet. The data on US fleet was obtained from sales data
from Good Car & Bad Car tracking of sales data and the distribution of fleet weight
from EPA‘s Light-Duty automotive technology fuel economy trends from 1975 to
2013. The marginal effect values are estimated through iteration using the actual
values for each observation in the sample. The first iteration uses the first observation;
the second iteration used the second observation, etc. The average of all the iterations
was then taken. We performed this twice, first using the vehicle as the lighter vehicle
and then again as the heavier vehicle. The values of the marginal causal effect of the
striking vehicle are 0.0011 and 0.0015 respectively. Using the procedure disclosed
earlier, we estimate the probability of accident if the vehicle was the lighter vehicle at
0.001564 and 0.0702 if the vehicle was the heavier vehicle. Using a statistical value of
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life of $5.5Million in 2008 dollars (DOT 201332), we obtain accident net costs of
increasing the fleet by 50033 pounds of $40.26 billion related to fatalities and $10.13
billion related injuries (statistical value of serious injury used is $577,50034). The total
externalities due to serious injury and death are $50.38 billion. These results are
presented in Table 8.
External Costs due to Gasoline
We have estimated that the expected external cost of accident imposed on
lighter vehicles is about $44.6 billion. The heavier vehicles also consume more fuel
due to their larger weights. If we take the 2008 model year vehicle, a 500 pound
increase in fleet weight is about 10.35%. Klier (2010) finds that the elasticity of fuel
economy with respect to weight is about 0.67, translating to 6.93% lower fuel
economy estimates in these vehicles. And given the long run fuel economy estimates
for VMT of about -0.25, the effect on heavier vehicles is about 6.45% increases in
gasoline consumption. We also assume 2008 model year fuel economy of 23.9, annual
VMT of 15,000 miles, the annual fuel consumption of 628 gallons, average 2008
gasoline price of $2.5, a social cost of carbon of $20/ton, annual emissions per gallon
of gasoline of 8,887gCO2/gallon. The additional costs due to increased gasoline
consumption and emissions are $1.14 billion and $0.1 billion respectively for the
whole US fleet.

32

http://www.dot.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/VSL%20Guidance_2013.pdf
From data on US fleet trend, there has been a 500 pound increase US fleet over the same period to
2005.
34
The statistical value of serious injury is obtained by multiplying the Fraction of VSL for a serious
injury (0.105)
33
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Policy Approaches to External Accident Costs
Several policy approaches have been implemented to reduce the accident costs.
One approach is to tax drivers based on odometer readings, or through some other
technological systems that are attached to vehicles. An optimal policy would involve
per mile fees that differ on the basis of driver risk and vehicle attributes. Some other
policies could also be gasoline tax, etc.
Vehicle miles traveled (VMT) fees
A VMT or per mile fee charges drivers based on the distance they drive.
Unlike the gasoline tax, the vmt fee is a true usage based fee because a driver is
charged on actual use of the roadway. VMT fees generate more and stable revenue
than a gasoline tax because under a gasoline tax, more fuel efficient vehicles will
consume less gas for every distance covered than less fuel efficient vehicles. Under
VMT fees, technology improvements might not affect the distribution of fleet weight
or improve fleet fuel economy because it charges all vehicles the same flat rate. The
fees could be uniform or differentiated based on vehicle class. A uniform vmt charge
scheme is not efficient because it tends to levy too low a charge on vehicles with high
external costs ( leads in low welfare gains) and levy too high a charge on vehicles with
low external costs (high welfare gains). One way to overcome this is to design a
differentiated vmt fee.
Under a differentiated mileage charge, a per-mile charge based on vehicle type is
levied on each vehicle class. The resulting effects of charge in mileage is a function of
own price-effect and cross-price effect from increases in other vehicle classes. The
potential welfare gains from a differential mileage charge is lower than a gasoline tax
because some of the reduced demand from one vehicle class will be offset from the
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increased demand from another class (Parry 2003). Preliminary evidence from mileage
fee initiatives in the United States and other countries recommend several ways to
gather mileage data and charge fees. Significant privacy-related concerns from the
public and cost challenges have been raised in applying mileage fees to passenger
vehicles. Other challenges include how drives can contest charges, substantial start-up
and administrative costs.
Gasoline Tax
The government can also impose a per unit tax on the amount of gasoline consumed
by drivers. The intuition is that increased price will reduce the amount of driving
which in turn leads to aggregate reduction in external costs. How external costs
changes with improvements in fuel economy due to improved technology is not well
understood. For example, downweighting could improve fuel economy but may make
occupants less safe; although drivers might internalize this risk when making purchase
decisions.
Cost of administration of a gasoline tax is very low compared to mileage based charge
or fee. However, the costs associated with a gasoline tax are higher than an
equivalently scaled mileage tax because of the larger substitutions effect from the
gasoline tax. These costs are represented by reductions in consumer surplus under the
aggregate demand curve for gasoline. Also, under the gasoline tax system, the permile charge differs across vehicles in proportion to their mpg ratings. Because of the
positive correlation between gasoline per mile (from weight mpg relationship) and
external costs of accidents, we expect gasoline tax reduce more external costs than an
equivalently scaled uniform vmt fee system (Parry 2003).
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Weight Based Tax through a “Pay at the Pump” Tax
Since the externality costs vary based on the weight/type of the vehicle, one way to
internalize the externality is through a differentiated weight based tax. The tax could
be levied ex ante or ex post as a liability. One approach for implementing the weight
based tax ex ante could be through increased premium on liability insurance. Since
several states require drivers to obtain liability insurance, it would be easy to increase
the existing premiums to account for weight difference. Because insurance already
charge higher premiums for riskier drivers, it would be possible to charge heavier
vehicles more because they are more likely to be involved in more accidents and
impose more risks on others. This weight based premium could be implemented in
such a way that it interacts with factors such as driving record through a multiplicative
factor as opposed to a fixed dollar increase related to weight. Charging heavier
vehicles higher premiums based on their weight could encourage drivers of such
vehicles to adjust their risk levels. The downside to the weight based tax is that some
states allow drivers to carry no insurance at all and others to only carry up to $10,000
coverage (with most common coverage amount being $25,000). Given the existence of
such limited liability insurance contracts, there are few incentives for insurance
companies to set higher insurance premiums for heavier vehicles. Another issue is the
large percentage of uninsured drivers in some states35.
In place of gasoline taxes, or fixed mileage charges, drivers could be charged a ―Pay at
the Pump‖ tax that accounts for both the weight of the vehicle and fuel consumption.
The ―Pay at the Pump‖ tax (Khazoom1997) involves bundling the additional insurance

35

As much as 30% of uninsured drivers exist in some states (White 2004)
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premium with gasoline purchases. ―Pay at the Pump‖ levies a surcharge that reflects
the externality per mile for each driver. Adding the surcharge will increase the
gasoline price, which in turn may lead to some reduction in travel demand based on
elasticity of driving to gasoline price changes. The ―Pay at the Pump‖ policy ensures
that the VMT will equal the optimal level and remove the distortions in resource
allocation. Because the marginal cost facing the driver incorporates the full marginal
exposure to risk. The ―Pay at the Pump‖ surcharge that internalizes the total
externality amounts to 34 c/gallons ($46.13 Billion/137.5 billion gallons of gasoline).
The advantages of the ―Pay at the Pump‖ tax are that it ultimately reduces the
externality cost by removing uninsured motorists from the road. In addition, in the
short term it provides incentives for drivers to switch to more efficient vehicles
because the resulting increase in gasoline price due to the surcharge induces driver to
switch to more fuel efficient vehicles will pay less than her marginal exposure risks.
The converse is true for a low fuel efficient vehicle. Over time, the increase gasoline
price (arising from surcharge) induces a demand for newer, lighter, more efficient
vehicles by owners of heavier less efficient vehicles.
Conclusion
Following the introduction of weight indexed fuel efficiency standards which
have resulted in an increase in the weight of the vehicle fleet; this study examines the
effect on societal safety of consumers demand for heavier vehicles. We present
empirical estimates of the effect of vehicle heavier fleet on accident costs that
adequately accounts for selection bias due to moral hazard issues. We capture
unobserved driver behavior as correlated outcomes between the two dimensions of
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vehicle safety. We find that increasing the weight of heavier vehicles increases the
expected of occupant fatalities by 50-64% while decreasing expected number of
fatalities by 21-26%. Based on our estimates, we find that not accounting for selection
bias due to moral hazard problems results in estimates of the effect of weight
externality that are downwardly biased by as much as 14%.
We first develop a theoretical framework model of individual driver choice for
vehicle weight and risk aversion behavior that leads to Nash equilibrium with a
predominantly heavier fleet. Then we employ data on fatal and non-fatal injuries to
estimate the external costs of additional weight in two vehicle crashes. Though
difficult to estimate empirically, we apply an estimator with a lognormally distributed
random effect for bivariate count processes to account for selection bias due to moral
hazard. In addition, we use two different testing schemes to confirm the existence of
selection bias due to moral hazard problems.
First, we find that increasing the weight of a vehicle will increase the
probability being involved in an accident. This is because, increasing the weight of a
vehicle will increase the probability of it being the heavier vehicle in an accident,
offering better protection, so the driver will reduce care level36. We also find that
factors which reduce the probability of having severe injuries in two vehicle crashes
induce them to be involved in more collisions weakly confirming the presence of
Peltzman type behavioral responses. When we apply the 2008 statistical values of life
values to our estimates, we find that the external costs in 2008 dollars are $51.84
billion. These results are obtained under the assumption of certain risk behavior by
36

Also, the increased probability of heavier vehicles being involved in accidents could be
explained by their physical characteristics and the potential response of drivers of heavier vehicles.
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drivers and the results could vary under different assumptions about the risk attitudes
of drivers. These costs are borne by the society in the form of medical bills, lost
earnings, social security payments, etc.
These values have serious policy implications. In theory, an efficient fleet
could be achieved through a carefully calibrated tax based on careful cost-benefit
analysis. However, such a tax policy may pose practical problems of implementation
in terms of public acceptance and monitoring. Given that the societal costs of traffic
accidents vary by weight, we also find that implementing a weight based tax such as a
―Pay as You Pump‖ surcharge of the 38c/gallon could fully internalize the costs. A
policy such as the proposed one will also lead to the adoption of more fuel efficient
vehicles over time and reduction in the weight of the fleet.
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Figure 1-A: Mean-Variance Relationship for Number of Fatal Crashes in Months
Mean-Variance
by State Relationship

.05

.1

Variance

.15

.2

.25

Number of Fatal Crashes in Months by State

0

Neg.Bin
Poisson.
0

.05

.1

.15

.2

.25

Mean

Relationship
Figure 1-B: Mean VarianceMean-Variance
Relation for Number
of Fatalities in Struck Vehicle
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Notes: Figure 1A and 1B above are plots of variance against mean for two different models with exactly
the same covariates. The figure was plotted by first creating 20 groups based on Poisson and negative
binomial model and then computing the mean and variance for each group, and then finally plotting the
mean-variance relationship.
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Figure 2: Predicted and Observed probabilities of Fatal Accidents
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Figure 3: Predicted probability of Fatality in Struck Vehicle against Striking
Vehicle Weight
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Two Vehicle Collision
Full Samplea
Sample
Std.
Mean
Size
Dev.
(1)
(2)
(3)
Number of Fatalities
Number of Seriously
Injured Occupants
Age
Sex
Alcohol Involved
Restraint Used
Number of Occupants
Model Year
Weight (lbs)
Light Trucks Share

Regression Sampleb
Sample Size

Mean

Std. Dev.

(4)

(5)

(6)

265,633

0.18%

6.5

248,572

0.26

6.5

265,633

5.36%

36.8

248,572

7.64%

36.7

252,127 39.17 15.99
261,174
0.44
0.50
265,633 6.01% 0.36
265,633 92.06% 1.55
258,759
1.41
0.67
265,633 2002
5.72
262,110 3388
551
258,130 29.9% 36.53

248,572
248,572
248,572
248,572
248,572
248,572
248,572
248,572

39.20
0.46
10.97%
93.27%
1.47
2000
3473
30.6%

18.93
0.49
0.31
3.10
0.87
5.12
630.29
36.9

Notes: aThe full sample contains observations that have information on the injury outcome of drivers‘
involved in crashes between 2008 and 2012 and the vehicle was manufactured on or after 1980.
b
The regression sample contains observations from the full sample that does not have a missing value for
any of the independent variables.
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Table 2: Regression Estimates of Number Occupant Fatalities- No Selection

Weight of Struck Vehicle

Dependent Variables = Number of Fatalities in Struck vehicle
NBREG
NBREG
OLS
-0.001***
-0.307***
-0.337***
(0.000)
(0.085)
(0.070)
[-0.0009]
[-0.0009 ]

Weight of Striking Vehicle

Effect of 1000 Pounds increase in striking
vehicle weight
Driver Attributes
Year Dummies
county Dummies
Model Year Dummies
Observations

0.336***
(0.047)
[0.0010]

0.338***
(0.065)
[0.0011]

0.001***
(0.000)

40%

42%

40%

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
248,572

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
248,572

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
248,572

Notes: Heteroskedasticity-Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The stars
indicate the level of significance. Marginal Effects (evaluated at the representative values of the explanatory
variables) for the negative binomial model are provided in brackets. We only report for the key independent
variables: the weight of the vehicles involved in the crash. The weight effects of the striking vehicle are computed
on the basis of a 1000 pound increase in weight over all observations in the model.
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Table 3: First-Stage Regression Results
Dependent Variables = P(Accident=1)
OLS
Probit
Natural Log of Total Vehicle Miles Travelled a

0.0011***
(0.0001)

0.0158***
(0.0772)

Percentage of Share of Light Duty Truck VMT

0.0206*
(0.0103)

0.1719***
(0.0087)

Weight of Involved Cars per 1000 Pounds

0.0010**
(0.0004)

0.0232**
(0.0099)

Yes
Ys
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
-4,147

333,763

333,763

Includes State Dummies
Includes Year Dummies
Year by State Dummies
Other Demographic Controls
log likelihood
# Observations

Notes: Heteroskedasticity-Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The stars indicate the level of significance. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to
one if the vehicle was involved in an accident in which there was serious injury or fatality.
a. The value reported is the difference between the coefficient of natural log of 100 Million vehicle
miles travelled per state and that of traffic density.
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Table 4: Second Stage Regression Results
Dependent Variables = Number of Fatalities in Struck Vehicle
No-Selection
CF
SML
Weight of Struck Vehicle

-0.307***
(0.085)
[-0.0009]

-0.276***
(0.081)
[-0.0008]

-0.246***
(0.089)
[-0.006]

Weight of Striking Vehicle

0.336***
(0.064)
[0.0011]

0.460***
(0.074)
[0.0015]

0.497***
(0.070)
[0.0017]

-0.344
(0.010)

-0.395
(0.011)

ρ
Effect of 1000 Pounds increase in striking
vehicle weight

42%

57.9%

64.37%

Effect of 1000 Pounds increase in struck
vehicle weight
#Observations

-26.4%
240,105

-23.9%
240,103

-21.8%
240,013

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The stars indicate the level
of significance. Estimates are for two-vehicle collisions from 2008 to 2012. The results displayed are
estimated after accounting for selection. The key explanatory variable is the weight of the vehicle.
Column CF uses the control function methodology to correct for the selection while the SML column is
the preferred model and is described in the paper.
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Table 5: Second Stage Regression Estimates for Serious Injury Model
Dependent Variable = Number of Seriously Injured Occupants in Struck Vehicle
No Selection
Selection
Weight of Struck Vehicle

-0.171***
(0.016)
[-0.096]

-0.165***
(0.0192)
[0.028]

Weight of Striking Vehicle

0.163***
(0.012)
[0.012]

0.202***
(0.0513)
[0.0317]

ρ

0

0.5622
(0.0190)

Effect of 1000 Pounds increase in striking vehicle weight
Effect of 1000 Pounds increase in Struck vehicle weight

19%
17%

23%

248,857

248,003

# Observations

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The stars indicate the level
of significance. The marginal effect of a 1000 pound increase in weight of striking vehicle are in brackets.
Estimates are for two-vehicle collisions from 2003 to 2012.
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Table 6: Alternative Specification
Dependent Variable = Number of Fatalities in Struck Vehicle
(7)
Mass Ratio Struck Vehicle to Striking Vehicle

-1.460***
(0.187)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Driver Attributes
Weather Attributes
Air Bags
Dummy for Alcohol Use
Year Dummies
City Dummies
Model Year Dummies

247,222

#Observations

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 8 Falsification Test
Dependent Variable = Number of
Pedestrian/Motorcyclists/Bicyclists Fatalities
0.170***
Weight of Vehicle
(0.0165)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
10,910

Driver Attributes
Weather Attributes
Air Bags
Dummy for Alcohol Use
Year Dummies
City Dummies
Model Year Dummies
#Observations

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. Stars indicate level of significance
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Table 8: Accident-Related Externalities
Total External
Costs/Benefits (Billions)
Traffic Related External Costs
Fatalities Only
40.26
Serious Injury Only
10.13
Fatalities + Serious Injuries
50.38
Gasoline Related Externalities
Fuel Savings
Reduced Emissions
Fuel Savings + Reduced Emissions

1.36
0.10
1.46

Total Externalities

51.84

External Costs per
($/gallon)
0.29
0.07
0.37

0.38

Notes: The externality cost of traffic accident is estimated under the assumptions that increasing the
mass of a vehicle increases the probability to be the heavier vehicle in a collision and the expected mass
difference given a collision with a lighter vehicle. The expected externality is computed as the sum of
the expected cost given a collision with a heavier vehicle and expected cost give a collision with a lighter
vehicle. The externality computation uses the Department of Transport's guidance on statistical value of
life (VSL) value of $5.5 Million and statistical injury of $577,500 (2005) updated to 2008 dollar values.
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Abstract
If consumers are heterogeneous in their preference for vehicle attributes and rates of time preference,
they will sort into different vehicles based on fuel economy. Bento et al(2012) suggests that estimates
of MWTP for future fuel costs can be distorted if individuals choose vehicles according to idiosyncratic
tastes and rates of time preferences. This paper describes how sorting resulting from individual
unobserved heterogeneity and time preference biases estimates of MWTP for future gasoline costs and
implement estimation strategies that correct such bias.
Using data from consumer expenditure survey, we recover MWTP estimates that do not show any
evidence of consumer undervaluation of MWTP for future gasoline costs for the average consumer. We
recover each consumer‘s valuation of fuel economy as well as the distribution of estimates of value of
fuel economy in the population using a model that integrates vehicle choice with driving intensity.
Given consumer‘s expectations of future gasoline price and tastes, they first choose a vehicle and then
conditional on vehicle stock; dynamically adjust their driving habits in response to gasoline prices. We
use an estimation strategy that accounts for both the likely correlations in error terms between the
discrete and continuous margins as well as cross-equation restrictions imposed by the integrated
behavioral model.
We find that consumers are heterogeneous in the valuation of fuel economy and uncover three segments
based on their valuation of fuel economy. One group, those with environmentally driven preference
pays significantly more than $1 per dollar gas savings and uses their vehicles frugally (about 18%). A
second group (68%) only looks it as a purely financial decision and rationally values fuel economy.
This group roughly pays $1 per dollar gas savings. A third group, which one can consider to be
myopic, are willing to pay less than $1 per dollar savings.
Our results suggest that gasoline taxes would be a more efficient instrument to increase fleet wide fuel
economy.

Keywords: Fuel Economy, Heterogeneity, Sorting, Gasoline Prices, MWTP
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Introduction
In the last few decades, the U.S. government has introduced several taxes and
subsidies on the purchase of new vehicles that depend on the performance of vehicle
fuel economy. The main driver for taxation of fuel economy is to correct externalities
that result from fuel consumption. Cost-benefits analyses of these regulations require
precise estimates of the consumer marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for reduced
discounted future fuel costs (Parry et al 2007). While the literature on how consumer
value fuel economy is well established (Dreyfus and Viscusi 1995, Hausman 1979
Busse et al 2013, Alcott and Wozny 2013), a review of the literature on consumer
valuation of fuel economy is inconclusive (Greene 2010). Some of the studies find that
consumers overvalue fuel economy while others find undervaluation of fuel economy.
Several reasons have been given for the apparent undervaluation of fuel
economy. (Helfand and Wolverton 2009).37 The consumer heterogeneity argument
posits that if consumers have heterogeneous preferences, they will sort into different
groups (Deleire et al 2013, Bayer et al 2011). In a differentiated product market such
as automobiles, we expect that consumers with similar preferences for certain
attributes will make similar choices if they have similar preferences and face similar
constraints. In terms of fuel economy, consumers with high MWTP for discounted
future gasoline costs will sort into fuel efficient vehicles while those with low MWTP
will sort into inefficient vehicles. This sorting bias has implications for the ability of
econometric models to recover the value of fuel economy and other attributes.

One hypothesis is that consumers‘ decision on vehicle type is based solely on financial
considerations. However, consumers might have other fundamental values for fuel economy, including
concern for the environment.
37
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However, the sorting process also reveals information about consumer heterogeneity
that can be used to evaluate how consumers value fuel economy.
In this paper, we contribute to the literature on Energy Paradox38 by providing
empirical evidence that unobserved consumer heterogeneity could result in different
consumers sorting into different vehicle types. This implies that the coefficient on fuel
economy also reflects values on other attributes that are associated with fuel economy.
Unlike existing literature in this topic, this paper accounts for sorting bias due to
unobserved heterogeneity by using an ―equilibrium sorting‖39 model that uses a
mixture of distributions to characterize unobserved and observed heterogeneity among
households (Train and Winston 2007). The ―equilibrium sorting‖ model uses the
properties of market equilibria, as well as information on the behavior of economic
agents, to infer structural parameters that characterize agent heterogeneity. We pair the
random coefficient discrete choice model with a supply side model in which firms
compete in Bertrand Nash fashion with differentiated products; where price depends
on both the elasticity of demand and costs of production. With the random utility
model, we allow annual vehicle miles travelled, time preferences and expectations of
gasoline prices to vary across consumers. We treat the discounted operating costs and
vehicle costs as random variables. This allows us to obtain a distribution of
households‘ preferences for fuel economy across the population.

38

Energy Paradox is defined as the disconnect between net present value estimates of energy
conserving cost savings and what consumers actually pay on energy conservation (Metcalf and Hasset
1999, Jaffe et al 2001).
39
The paper uses a straight forward extension of the framework used by Bayer and Timmins (2003) to
examine sorting in consumer choice of vehicle type.
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Recent works on how consumers value fuel economy tend to use monthly
within vehicle variation over time in gasoline prices to identify consumer tradeoffs
between fuel costs and vehicle costs. The question is that in the presence of sorting
bias due to observed and unobserved consumer heterogeneity, whether this is an
accurate way to identify tradeoffs between vehicle costs and fuel economy.
Additionally, firms respond to gasoline prices in the short term by adjusting vehicle
costs to match sales. A key aspect of this is that prices are negotiated by dealers, and
will depend upon inventories. For example, if gas guzzlers are not selling, dealers will
offer price discounts. When demand is high for vehicles with high mileage, discounts
are lower, and dealers could charge a premium over the retail price. For example,
MacManus (2005) finds that the shift to higher fuel efficiency vehicles brought about
by rising gasoline prices were obscured by price cuts disproportionately aimed at gas
guzzlers. Panel data and individual fixed effects provide potential solutions when very
large data sets spanning long period are available. Chintanuga (2001) has shown that it
is important to control for both price endogeneity and heterogeneity to avoid potential
biases in demand side parameter estimates.
Therefore, we identify consumers weighting of discounted gasoline costs by
using the combination of functional form assumptions supported with information on
vehicle demand and elasticity extracted from observed vehicle transaction prices. We
use data on household vehicle holdings from the automobile extract of the consumer
expenditure survey covering the period 2002-2005. This dataset contains information
on the vehicle purchases and driving habits of a random sample of US households.
We have actual data on the number of miles travelled by each household and vehicle
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type40. The individual household data allows us to match vehicles with the household
demographic characteristics of those who own them and estimate how different
segments of the population value fuel economy. We exploit the unique attributes of
the CEX dataset (it contains information on vehicle miles travelled, when consumers
trade-in older vehicles and expenditure on fuel costs) to estimate a richer random
coefficient model in which we are able to identify heterogeneity in the weighting of
discounted future gasoline costs by different consumers. In addition, we also account
for volatility in gasoline price by allowing households to continually update their
expectations of gasoline price. In future time periods, households dynamically adjust
their driving habits in response to gasoline price.
The consumer heterogeneity we find is substantial and significant. The
heterogeneity arises from huge differences in the amount of miles travelled by
consumers and heterogeneity in expectation of gasoline prices and time preferences.
We find that a substantial portion (61%) of upper the 95% of households in our
sample correctly value fuel economy as they are willing to pay $0.99 to reduce obtain
a $1.00 discounted future gasoline costs over the lifetime of the vehicle. Another
group, those with environmentally driven preference pays significantly more than $1
per dollar gas savings and uses their vehicles frugally (about 28% of the upper 95%
overvalue fuel economy as they are willing to pay an average of $1.57). The lower 5%
of our sample are willing to pay only $0.50 for a $1 reduction in future fuel costs.
These results are in contrast to those reported elsewhere by Alcott and Wozny (2009)

40

This is important because consumers will most likely adjust their mileage driven of different vehicles
based on gasoline prices. At high prices, consumers are more likely to put more miles on the Prius than
a Suburban.
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but support results from the simulation study by Bento et al 2012 who find that not
accounting for sorting bias and consumer heterogeneity could lead to a conclusion that
consumers undervalue fuel economy. In that light, our results might not necessarily
imply that consumers overvalue/undervalue fuel economy, but can be interpreted as
being heterogeneous in their valuation of fuel economy.
How consumers weigh temporal effects of future fuel costs have important
policy implications. This is because the nature of the temporal weighting helps in
determining if market failure exists and also helps indicate whether policy
prescriptions that affect initial vehicle costs such as gas guzzlers tax will reduce fuel
consumption at lower costs than gasoline tax. In addition, results from such
―equilibrium sorting‖ models can be used to develop theoretically consistent
predictions for the welfare implications of future policy changes on fuel economy and
gasoline taxes.
In the last few decades, the literature on how to estimate consumer‘s qualityadjusted prices of automobiles have grown. Most of the literature in this area has
mostly involved the relationship between fuel economy and fuel price and pricevehicle safety tradeoffs. However, the fuel economy–price tradeoff has received the
most attention (Hausman 1979, Mannering and Winston 1985, Zauberman 2003,
Greene 2010). And it is this part of the literature that this paper contributes. Estimates
of how much consumers are willing to pay to reduce fuel costs vary greatly (Greene
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2010). Of the 25 studies reviewed by Greene, about half find that consumers
undervalue fuel economy while just five report values suggesting overvaluation.41
Recent studies, however, appear to agree that households either fully value or
modestly undervalue energy costs when making car purchase decisions. Alcott and
Wozny (forthcoming) and Busse et al 2013, report implied discount rates closer to
borrowing rates and conclude that these are evidence of lack of consumer myopia.
Alcott (2013) finds slight undervaluation in fuel economy. Sallee et al (2009) use
micro data on used vehicle prices, odometer readings and gasoline prices to estimate
the relationship between fuel costs and vehicle prices. In the same vein, Sawhill
(2008) using ARIMA models of fuel price expectations, does not find any evidence
that consumer‘s underweight future operating costs. Using simulated data, Bento et al.
(2012) show that consumer heterogeneity can result in sorting leading to downward
bias in estimates of the WTP for fuel economy savings.
This work is closely related to the work of Bento et al (2012), Sawhill (2008),
Alcott and Wozny (2009) Bayer et al (2011). However, this paper extends the
literature in several respects. Our work is different from Sawhill‘s in several
respects42. The main difference between this work and these papers is on the
identification strategy; explicitly accounting for heterogeneity and sorting; and
including information about the supply side. First, we use individual household data
why Sawhill used aggregate data. In addition, while we both control for price
endogeneity (Sawhill uses BLP‘s contraction mapping method and does not include
information about pricing behavior). Unlike Bento et al (2012), this work is an
41
42

From $0.01 (Berry et al 1995) to $1.00 (Dreyfus and Viscusi 1995).
Both papers use random coefficient logit models.
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empirical study rather than a simulation and such provides empirical evidence of the
effect of consumer heterogeneity in estimates of the consumer trade-off of fuel
economy and vehicle costs.
This paper is structured as follows. Section two discusses the equilibrium model
composed of a demand side and supply side model. Section three, present the data
used for the analysis. Section Four discusses the identification and estimation strategy
as well as the challenges in estimating the specification. This is followed by the results
and discussion and finally, we conclude in section six.
Methodology and Conceptual Framework
The model is consistent with a structural model of equilibrium of a
heterogeneous product competition. The approach is based on earlier models by
Goldberg (1995) and Amil Petrin (2002), but with significant differences. The method
aggregates individual preferences into market level demand system, and combines
assumptions on cost functions and pricing behavior to generate equilibrium prices and
quantities. The estimation strategy is divided into two different steps. In the first step,
the paper estimates household-level demand functions and then aggregates these
individual functions to construct estimated firm demand curves. In the second step, we
use the estimated demand curves to solve firms‘ first order conditions under the
assumptions of Bertrand –Nash competition. The demand side of the model is based
on a random utility function of consumer vehicle choice following Berry, Levinsohn
and Pakes (1995; henceforth, BLP). The demand specification is paired with a supply
side.
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Consumer Preferences for fuel economy
This paper treats the demand for a new vehicle as an intertemporal choice
problem in which consumers‘ trade-off future fuel savings and vehicle price. Each
household derives utility from both vehicle ownership and utilization. We derive and
estimate a model of automobile demand that accounts for households‘ vehicle
quantity, vehicle type (make, model and vintage) and the continuous choice of
utilization.
Household i maximize utility U ijt from choosing vehicle j or not (the outside good) in
each choice occasions t=1,….T. The household‘s joint utility from quantity and
vehicle type j is additive and can be expressed with a random indirect utility given by:

U ijt  Vijt   ij
Vijt'    i p j   it Gijt   i xij   i

(1)
(2)

where αi, βi and γi are individual specific taste parameters. pj is transaction price for
vehicle j. We allow preferences over price to vary with income so that αi represents
the individual specific marginal utility of income. Specifying vehicle price this way
(with income) ensures that the indirect utility function from which we obtain the
demand for discrete alternatives satisfy Roy‘s Identity. This implies that within any
household vehicle ownership level, the marginal rate of substitution between gasoline
costs and vehicle costs is income independent (Mannering and Winston 1985). xj , is
the vector of observed vehicle attributes interacted with demographic variables
(includes product intercept term). A random variable (ζ νi ) is included to account for
correlation in unobserved utility over the choice alternatives (Brownstone and Train
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1999).43 By specifying the xij appropriately, you can construct any pattern of
covariance across alternatives. Gijt is the expected future fuel cost over the vehicle
lifetime is represented by:

 Tj

s
Gijt   t  1  ri  g t  s mij ,t  s 1 mpg j 
 s 0


(3)

where T is the vehicle expected lifetime for model j, r is household specific discount
rate, gt+s is the expected gasoline price at time t+s, mij,t+s is the annual vehicle miles
travelled in year t+s by vehicle j for individual i. mpgj is the fuel consumption rate in
miles per gallon. In this model, heterogeneity derives from different consumers having
discount rates and annual miles travelled. The model therefore explicitly accounts for
consumer heterogeneity in their valuation of fuel economy. 𝜀𝑖𝑗 = 𝜂𝜉𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗 .  ' is a
vector of parameters associated controls (Kim and Petrin 2010), ϵij is iid extreme
value. 𝜉 is the average utility of consumers from unobserved attributes of product j
independent and idiosyncratic utility an individual obtains from the vehicle (however
it could be correlated with the unobserved product attributes) and it is iid extreme.
The terms in 𝜂𝜉𝑗 represent unobserved utility component that induces
correlation as well as substitution in vehicle to overcome the independent of irrelevant
alternative problem (IIA) (Train 2003). The implication of the expectation term is that
when consumers‘ tradeoff of future fuel savings against vehicle prices, they consider
how fuel efficient the vehicle is, the number of miles to drive, what the price of
gasoline will be in the future and other vehicle characteristics such as horsepower,
environmental factors, etc.

43

The coefficient ζ, is the standard deviation of the random coefficient reflecting the degree of
correlation among the choice alternatives and νi is the iid standard normal deviate.
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The specification of the expectation term allows mileage to vary with customer
and gasoline prices. Conventionally testing for whether consumers undervalue fuel
economy is a test of the null hypothesis of α=γ44 (Alcott and Wozny 2009, Anderson
et al 2013; Bento et al 2012). A major assumption that these papers and others have
made is that gasoline prices follow a random walk model, that is consumers‘ future
gasoline prices expectation at time t+s,(gt+s) is equivalent to the current gasoline price.
This assumption allows the expectation term to be reduced to





1 r
T mij * g t
1  1  1
r
mpg j

(4)

While most authors assume that consumers‘ expectations of future gasoline
prices follow a random walk model, some authors have used different assumptions
about future expectations of gasoline price. Alcott and Wozny 2009 assume that future
expected gasoline prices is a function of the future price of crude in the commodity
futures market and a factor to account for refining costs, taxes and distribution costs.
However, oil price futures have been known to be very poor predictors of future price
changes in crude markets (Hamilton 2009, 1983; Menzie and Coibion 2013). Sawhill
(2008) and Khan (1986) both fit ARIMA models to retail gasoline prices to obtain
consumers expectations of future gasoline price.
Vehicle price is affected by omitted variable bias for several reasons (Train
2003) and as such the 𝜉𝑗 term does not have a zero mean. For example, the
econometrician may have information on fuel efficiency, weight, length, horsepower,
color, etc, but may not have information on other attributes such as prestige, style,
44

Alcot and Wozny (2009) assume that consumers all consumers are homogeneous in their ability to
trade-off future fuel savings for current vehicle prices. The model specified in 2 allows some
heterogeneity in consumers‘ ability to tradeoff vehicle price for future fuel costs at different rates.
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comfort, etc. These attributes affect price. The existence of the unobserved attributes
implies that vehicles sort into groups or market segments, and that models within each
segment compete more closely with one another than with models belonging to other
market segments. This causes the price, to be correlated with the unobserved
attributes, 𝜉𝑗 . One method to overcome this endogeneity is to move 𝜉𝑗 into the
component of the utility that is observed by introducing an alternative specific
constant for each product j (Petrin and Train 2006, Train 2009, BLP 1995). However,
due to the difficulty of estimating the contraction required for the BLP approach and
the fact that some vehicle models could have zero shares because the model is not
offered for sale in some periods; this research will adopt the control function approach
to deal with potential endogeneity of vehicle price(Kim and Petrin 2010, Klein and
Vella 2010).45
The probability that household i choose alternative j on choice occasion t,
conditional on the model structural parameters is given by

Prit ( j ) 

e

Vij

e

(5)

Vij

Averaging Pij over the N consumers in the sample (Train and Winston 2007),
we can obtain the market share for each product. We then express the market share for
each product as:

S j   Pij / N

6

i

Conditional on the household choosing alternative j, the utilization/demand for
vehicle miles travelled is obtained from equation 2 by applying Roy‘s Identity. If we
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represent household i actual utilization of vehicle j at period t as Mijt, and 𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 as the
observed utilization (because of measurement error and the fact that preferences are
not actually observed), then the utilization equation is 𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜗𝑖𝑗𝑡 , where 𝜗𝑖𝑗𝑡
is the error term. The same variables are used in estimating both the choice and
utilization equations.
Supply Model and Equilibrium Prices
This section develops the supply side of the model in which vehicle
manufacturers set prices to maximize profits, given price of its competitors. Vehicles
are differentiated, that is two very similar vehicles from different manufacturers will
be priced differently. The supply side is similar to the supply side model of BLP
(1995) and Train (2003). The intuition behind the supply side model is that given the
aggregated demand curves and market shares, one can solve for the product specific
marginal costs by solving the equilibrium first order conditions. This approach allows
us to solve for new equilibrium prices given counterfactuals and assumptions about
consumer behavior. We assume that firms, f,= 1,…..F, compete in a Bertrand Nash
fashion under a differentiated product. The manufacturer sets prices pj= (p1j,……pTj), let
𝜉 = (𝜉 1, ….. 𝜉 J)’ denote vector of unobserved product attributes. In the short term,
firms only change prices. Firm f‘s profit function is given by:

Max f  p, Z ,     p jt  mc( X , Z ) j S j ( p.)N

(7 )

j 1

where pj is as defined earlier, N is the number of US households, Sj is the predicted
market share obtained by summing individual consumers weighted sum of vehicle
selection probabilities, mc is the unit variable cost of product j. Similarly as in
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equation 2, X contains the consumer expectations about future fuel costs and Z
represents exogenous demand shifters.
Following the procedure developed by Villas-Boas (2007)46, we solve equation
7 for the first order conditions with respect to price. From the first order conditions in
a Bertrand Game, automobile prices depend on the marginal costs of a product. The
marginal cost in turn depends on both observed product attributes and unobserved
product attributes, input prices (rent, wages, and other cost shifters). Some of the cost
shifters could be observed by the econometrician.
mc j  W ( X j , c j , )   j

(8)

where W(.) is a parameter function.  j is a random error, normal, and depends on
both observed and unobserved attributes. Solving for the first order conditions, one
obtains equations that satisfy the price-cost mark-ups 𝑝𝑗 − 𝑚𝑐𝑗 47 and market share for
each product that satisfies the function given below. The vector of mark-ups only
depends on the parameters of the demand equations and equilibrium price vector.
  f  p, X ,  
p j

 S j ( p, X ; )   ( p j  mc j )

S j ( p, X ; )

j

mc  p  p, X;  Sp, X; 
1

p j

0

(9)

(10)

where  is a J x J matrix whose terms are given by:
 j

 S j

  p j
0


if j and are producedby same firm

(11)

otherwise

We can easily use 11 for counterfactual policy simulation to solve for new equilibrium
price vectors.
46

Also Villas-Boas and Winer 1999
The Bertrand Model without product differentiation implies price equals marginal cost. Because we
are assuming product differentiation, this is not the case here.
47
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Data

Data
The data sets used for the analysis were obtained from several sources. The
primary data used for this analysis is the automobile extract from the Consumer
Expenditure Survey. The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), a rotating panel of
US household purchasing pattern over 5 quarters conducted by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, is a stratified random sample. Every quarter, 25% of the households in the
sample are replaced with new households. I make use of data from 2002-2005. Each
quarter about 4500-5000 distinct individuals are interviewed on their expenditure;
75% of those interviewed are re-interviewed and a new set of households replaces the
other 25%. The automobile extract provides detailed information on all cars owned by
households at the beginning of the survey year, on any cars purchased between the
households first and last year as well as on any disposal of vehicles by the households.
Table 1 provides information on demographics48 of the estimation sample, and it is
consistent with U.S population‘s socioeconomic data. Since the CEX are weighted
random sample of representative U.S. households, we expect the data to be
representative of aggregate vehicle purchase pattern of all U.S.49 This table also shows
significant variations in household characteristics across the vehicle classes. For
example, larger households especially with more kids prefer SUVs and larger vehicles.
Wealthier households (as measured by total yearly expenditures) also possess larger

48

Among the wide range of household demographic information the survey contains includes size of
household, age of household members, sex, employment status, type of residence, whether or not the
household is located in a rural or urban area, education level, household income
49
However, Goldberg (1998) suggests that the CEX underestimate the total sales of new vehicles due to
the existence of fleet sales.
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vehicles. Also, households with more workers or income earners and those with male
heads are inclined to have SUVs.
Each year about 400 households in the CEX sample buy new vehicles (that is
about 10% of sampled households purchase new vehicles) from approximately 200
different make and models. Therefore some models only appear infrequently in our
estimation sample while others may not appear at all. We exclude a small number of
households due to missing information on key variables such as date of purchase and
other attributes. We are then left with 1,506 households who purchased new vehicles
between 2002 and 2005.
The information on automobiles includes the make, model, vintage and
purchase price of each car, financing, disposal of old vehicles, and a large set of
vehicle characteristics. Most importantly, the CEX includes the mileage of each car
owned by the household during each quarter. I will supplement these datasets with
data on vehicle characteristics from EPA fuel economy test data and Automotive
News Market Data Book. The former provides information on fuel economy measured
in miles per gallon50. While the latter includes information on size, performance, and
standard options of various models. Data on annual observations of certain
microeconomic and macroeconomic variables also included as well as gasoline prices.
Summary statics of the attributes of the estimation model is provided in Table 2. Each
consumer‘s choice set consists of 198 makes and models of new vehicles.
Information on gasoline prices (incl. state and local taxes) is taken from the
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). EIA collects weekly retail gasoline

50

The mpg values are combined EPA mpg values: a weighted average of City and Highway MPG
values that is calculated by weighting the City value by 55% and the Highway value by 45%.
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prices for all formulations (conventional, oxygenated and reformulated gasoline
prices), which are recorded by State. We match individual households in the
automobile purchase dataset to state-level gasoline prices based on the respondents
state of origin. A big advantage of focusing on the 2002-2005 period is that it includes
the sharp decline of gas prices at the end of 2002-beginning 2003 so that there is
ample variation in the data to identify the consumer responses to lower gasoline prices
as well as higher gas prices in late 2005.
Finally, we also collect information on interest rates on new and old car loans
from the Federal Reserve and Consumer Price Index for all goods from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics.
Discounted Future Gasoline Price Expectations
Gasoline prices are generally difficult to predict. When consumers make
vehicle purchase decisions, how they form expectations for future gasoline prices is
not well known. The most common assumption past works have made is that
consumers treat the gasoline price process as a random walk, with any price shock
considered permanent with subsequent adjustments in demand (Biesebroeck and
leuven 2010) . However if the price shocks decay rapidly, then estimated elasticity
will be biased because price shock will have less of an effect on demand and measured
price elasticities will be lower.
Consistent with prior literature, we will make the assumption that current
gasoline prices are best predictors of the expected future gasoline prices, i.e. gasoline
prices are follow a random walk process with time trend. Support for the random walk
hypothesis comes from Anderson et al (2012) who concluded that the random walk
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process is a good reflection of consumer expectations of future gasoline prices.
Additional support is provided by the result of a dickey fuller test in which we fail to
reject the null hypothesis that average monthly gasoline prices exhibits a unit root.
Figure 1 is a time series plot of the natural log of the real price of gasoline prices
between January 1994 to December 2012.
A look at this figure casts some doubt about the propriety of using a random
walk model to represent consumer expectations of future gasoline prices. It looks more
like a random walk with trend or ARIMA model. As a robustness check, we specify an
alternative model of consumer expectation of future gasoline prices that follows an
ARIMA process. Monthly data on real gasoline prices from 1994-2005 indicates an
ARIMA (1, 1, 1) in the log of real gasoline prices. To construct the expectations series
for each year with the ARIMA model, we use only lagged data to generate sets of
forecasts that use information from the customers to update their most recent forecasts.
Figure 1b is a plot of the forecasts from the model using this procedure superimposed
over forecast that just uses one period ahead.
Another important assumption we make in constructing consumer expectations
of future gasoline costs is related to consumer demand for annual vehicle mileage
conditional on buying a new vehicle. We assume that consumer demand for annual
vehicle miles travelled is heterogeneous and varies with gasoline price. While the
short run elasticity of vehicle usage with respect to gasoline is low -0.15 (Hughes et al
2008, Gillingham 2011); in the long run, the average elasticity values hover around 0.7. That is a 10 percent rise in gasoline prices will reduce driving by about 7 percent
through people switching to cars with better mileage and driving less. Most of the
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existing literature recognizes that consumers show significant variation in their
demand for annual mileage and we incorporate the consumers‘ heterogeneity for fuel
mileage by using customer specific mileage reported in consumer expenditure survey.
Incorporating Heterogeneity and Sorting
The wide variation in estimates of consumers‘ valuation of fuel economy
suggests that heterogeneity is still an issue. Take for example, the role of unobserved
individual heterogeneity. One such heterogeneity is consumer driving habits. Green
drivers may buy more fuel efficient vehicles and use them sparingly (i.e there is
positive correlation in vehicle choice draws across drivers), then estimates of the
consumer MWTP for fuel economy will be unnecessarily too high. It is also possible
that the correlation will be in the opposite direction. That is, heavy rivers will sort into
more fuel efficient vehicles in order to reduce cost per mile of driving.
A second problem arises if there is unobserved heterogeneity in individuals
expectations of gasoline prices. That is expectations might vary over consumers and
time. For example, consumers might expect gasoline prices to rise (especially if
purchase decisions are myopic), and choose to purchase more fuel efficient vehicles
thus lowering cost per mile of driving. When prices are high and rising, it might be
perfectly rational to expect future prices will be higher compared to expectations that
are formed when prices are low and stable. If we use average expectations of the
consumer to estimate consumer demand for fuel economy instead, that estimate will
be biased.
A third problem arises when individual drivers have heterogeneous rates of
time preferences. In particular, consumers who put less value in future costs (have
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present biased preferences) will underweight gasoline costs relative capital costs. This
is because gasoline costs occur in the future. Therefore, consumers that exhibit present
bias preferences will sort into less fuel efficient vehicles, biasing downward estimates
of consumer valuation of fuel economy. Although panel data and individual fixedeffects offer one solution to preference based sorting, other researchers have also used
other methods. Our estimation approach allows us to account for the individual
unobserved heterogeneity. We adopt the general form of heterogeneity-random
parameter representation. However, we re-parameterize the
𝛼𝑖𝑡 ,𝑘 = 𝛼𝑘 + 𝑧 ′ 𝑖 𝜃𝑘 + 𝜎𝑣𝑖
𝛾𝑖𝑡 ,𝑘 = 𝛾𝑘 + 𝑧 ′ 𝑖 𝜃𝑘 + 𝜎𝑣𝑖
mean estimates of the random parameters (vehicle capital costs and gasoline prices) to
establish heterogeneity (Hensher and Green 2003). Where 𝑧 ′ 𝑖 𝜃𝑘 + 𝜎𝑣𝑖 is the mean of
the distribution, zi is a vector of consumer specific attributes, 𝑘 = 1, … . . , 𝐾 is
simulated to find the values that maximize the simulated log likelihood (Green 2012).
The time-invariant error terms reflects habit-persistence. The presence of a standard
deviation of the two parameters accommodates the presence of preference
heterogeneity in the sampled population.
Estimation and Identification Strategy
Econometric Model and Estimation Strategy
Our estimation approach is driven by several factors. First, is that the durable
goods nature of automobiles implies that we have to account for both consumers‘ taste
for fuel efficiency and intensity of utilization in estimating elasticity. Therefore,
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households make a two-step decision. They first choose the number and type of
vehicles to own based on driving habits and expectations of future gasoline prices.
And in the second step, conditional on their vehicle bundles, they choose utilization
intensity which determines fuel consumption. The second decision influences
decisions about vehicle type choice in the first step. For example, a driver whose
demand for mileage is greater than the average driver should have a larger elastic
demand for fuel efficient vehicles and lower elasticity in the demand for gasoline
price. Part of this stems from the fact that the MWTP for fuel economy is an
increasing function of gasoline price (Van Biesebroeck and Leuven 2010).
Second, the error term of the different dimension of vehicle choice and
utilization are correlated. This correlation could be in either direction. For example, if
the unobserved taste parameter which induces some households to choose fuel
efficient vehicles also induces them to drive less, then the error terms will be
positively correlated. We can also imagine a situation in which the unobserved taste
parameters induce heavy drivers to increase utilization, resulting in the error terms
being negatively correlated.
Third, about 31% of the households in our sample have two vehicles and 14%
owning multiple vehicles. This lends to ―portfolio effects‖ as a possible interpretation
for households owning more than one vehicle. That is the mix of vehicles owned by
households satisfies different functions. We follow Dube(2004) and Hendel(1999) in
accounting for households ownership of portfolio of vehicles in a mixed logit with
repeated choice occasions framework. On each choice occasion, households make
discrete decision of vehicle type and amount of utilization conditional on type.
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Because we do not observe each choice occasion in our data set, we are unable to
precisely characterize the actual situations in which households consume each
alternative. However, we do observe the mile driven by each vehicle type, and this
allows us to model the distribution of consumption occasions and make inference
about the context in which they are consumed. One can relate different choice
occasions as representing different activities undertaken by the household that requires
driving such as school runs, shopping, weekend family gateways, etc. Intuitively,
household vehicle portfolio and annual mileage indicates heterogeneity in tastes for
various choice occasions. We explain the vehicle quantity of each household in terms
of demographic attributes (number of people in the household that work), vehicle
attributes, fuel costs, travel costs, etc. Intuitively, we expect households to switch from
a gas guzzler to a more fuel efficient vehicle if gasoline prices rise and vice-versa.
Identification
Our identification strategy is based on the fact that firms set prices on the basis
of demand for their products and that of the competitors. The prices (transaction
prices) are the result of negotiations with customers, and auto dealers will provide a
higher discount on cars that are selling slowly. The observed prices contain
information about price elasticities, which if correctly extracted can be used to
estimate the demand parameters. Therefore, we need to look at pricing behavior that
can arise in markets and show how the specification of this behavior can be combined
with the demand estimation to identify consumer demand for fuel economy. The
intuition is that auto firms also respond to fuel price changes in the short run by
adjusting relative prices to match sales. And in the medium run, firms can tweak small

134

design changes in months to improve fuel economy by orders of 0.1 to .2 mpg (Busse
et al 2013, Sallee and Slemrod 2010). An exogenous change in fuel prices thus
triggers endogenous changes in consumers‘ decision environment.
Given that we have a model for consumer expectations of future fuel costs,
intuitively we can estimate the logit demand model and test the null hypothesis that
the marginal utility of saving a dollar on the cost of a vehicle is equal to the marginal
utility of saving a dollar on the discounted expected operating costs over the vehicle
life span:
U i
U i

p j

E





 i i
  i  1 (6)
i

If firms compete under Nash Bertrand, when prices depend on elasticity of demand
and marginal cost, the pricing equation is:
p

p j   j   mc j
e
ij 

p

p j   j   W X j ,    j
e
ij 


(7)

We assume that 𝜉 and μ are jointly normal; the conditional distribution of 𝜉𝑗 given μj is
also normal. The unobserved component of the demand equation, 𝜉𝑗 , now enters the
pricing equation through the elasticity. As such we can rewrite the pricing equation as
(Kim and Petrin 2010):

p j  X j x j ,    j
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(8)

where xj is a vector of all of the observed exogenous variables that affect marginal cost
and the elasticity, X j(·) is a parametric function of these variables, and uj is the
unobserved deviations of price around this function (Train 2010, Kim and Petrin
2010). We can estimate the pricing equation and retain the residuals. This is done by
constructing estimates of the expected price for each model conditional on all
exogenous factors51.
Estimation proceeds in two steps. In the first step, we recover μ*, (the residuals
from the pricing equation) by inverting the pricing function. The product specific
unobserved factor, ξ, enters the reduced form pricing equation as an argument. The μ*
incorporates information about the 𝜇𝑗 and unobserved component of the elasticity
based mark-up (Train 2002). In the second step, having specified the pricing function,
we then estimate conditional choice model treating the controls as additional
regressors. What is left is the standard errors. We need to correct them using the
approach in Newey and McFadden (1994).
Because we have very few observations on the same nameplate over time and
moreover, vehicle attributes change, new models are added, some models are
discontinued, we cannot condition on a full set of fixed effects. Rather, we place
restrictions across the vehicles. The only restriction we place is that the parameters of
the pricing function are the same across all products and years.
Results
Parameter Estimates of Demand Model

51

We assume that 𝜇 𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑥 are not correlated.
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Point estimates and standard errors from the specifications are presented in Tables
4 and 5. Table 6 translates these results to elasticity estimates. The two variables of
interest are capital cost of vehicle (α) and discounted annual operating costs (γ)52.
Given that there is no specific direction in existing literature for other variables to
include; we include weight, horsepower, size (wheelbase and track width), drive train,
dummies if vehicle is an SUV, minivan, full sized van or pickup truck, and indicators
that reflect make of a given vehicle. The indicators capture extent of household
preference for a particular make of vehicle. We also control for engine size, but the
values are not reported because they are not of any particular interests for our
purposes. The demographic variables enter through interactions with vehicle
attributes. The parameters vector has a multivariate normal distribution. We divide the
coefficient on price by the income of consumer to allow the elasticity to vary with
income. This way, households with high income are less sensitive to prices than those
with low income.
Column 1 of Table 4 reports the logit specification without accounting for
heterogeneity or including information from firms pricing behavior. All other
coefficients are statistically significant. The coefficient on price is negative as
expected, but that on operating cost is positive which is counter intuitive. In Column 2,
we report random coefficient logit model with heterogeneity but do not include
information on firms pricing behavior nor account for price endogeneity. The
52

Fuel economy enters the consumers‘ utility function as annual operating costs. This is
determined as real price of gasoline per gallon divided by mpg of fuel, multiplied by the average annual
vehicle miles. This formulation accounts for the wide variations in the price of gasoline in different
locations and in annual miles travelled by different households. Importantly, it implies an inverse
relationship between increasing fuel economy and utility since fuel economy has an inverse relationship
with fuel consumption, while fuel expenditure have a linear relationship with consumption.
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coefficient of discounted annual operating costs switches signs. In addition, price and
all other variables have the right signs and are statistically significant. The values are
in line with estimates elsewhere53 (Train and Winston 2003, Petrin 2002, Kim and
Petrin 2010, Sawhill 2008, and BLP 1994).
Column 3 of Table 4 is our preferred model. In addition to accounting for
consumer heterogeneity and price endogeneity, this model also includes information in
firms pricing behavior. We expect the price elasticity to be higher than the result from
the random coefficient logit model (Train 2012, Kim and Petrin 2010). Correcting for
endogeneity and sorting improves the elasticity of both the capital cost and gasoline
costs significantly. The mean price coefficient is 3.581 and significant. The standard
deviation of a normally distributed price coefficient is 0.54.54 We recover mean price
coefficient with respect to discounted operating costs of 6.7855 with a t-value of 14.74.
We also find standard deviation of the normally distributed coefficient of discounted
yearly operating costs of 2.085 which implies that 95% of the drivers have mean
coefficients ranging from 2.69 to 10.87.
𝛾

We also report ratios of the coefficients of the two variables of interest: , with
𝛼

a value of 1.88. A Wald test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients on price and
discounted operating costs are equal is rejected at 5% level (W=26.48<χ2<3.65). We
𝛾

find that 95% of the consumers in our sample have values ranging from 0.99 to 1.88
𝛼

This large spread signifies heterogeneity in consumer response to fuel economy. In
53

The coefficient on vehicle cost.
This implies that 95% of the price coefficient over all models varies between 2.6 to 4.56.
55
Estimates of operating costs we report are not comparable to those reported elsewhere since they
represent different measures of fuel efficiency.
54
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this vein, we uncover three segments of discounted operating costs: 28% of the
consumers significantly overvalue fuel economy while 61% less so or are rational.
That is 61% of consumers in our sample make vehicle purchase decisions based on
financial considerations only. The rest, 11%, seems to underweight future gasoline
costs when making decisions. We profile the segments in terms of their average
demographic characteristics. On average, rational households are lager and tend to
have above average income, have higher number of school age children, men older
than 45 years.
These are in line with the predictions from Bento et al (2012) and the effect of
sorting and heterogeneity on parameter coefficient estimates (Bayer et al 2011). These
results reinforce their arguments that ignoring consumer heterogeneity leads to
undervaluation of energy savings by consumers. This is because consumer
heterogeneity results in sorting which results in downwards bias effect. These results
are in contrast to Alcott and Wozny (2009) who finds that report that consumers
undervalue fuel economy.
Cost Side Parameter Estimates
Table 5 reports the results of the regression of log of marginal costs on the
vehicle characteristics. All the regressors enter with significant coefficients and have
the expected signs. That is, it costs more to improve the fuel efficiency of a vehicle,
build a bigger car, add additional luxury and comfort, power and acceleration, as well
as increase weight. Next, we turn to the main question of this research by looking at
the implications of the estimates of accounting for pricing behavior of firms in
consumer valuation of fuel economy.
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Do Consumers Undervalue Fuel Economy
Table 6 presents estimates of several ratios of

𝛾
𝛼

computed over a range of discount

rates and vehicle lifetime values. These values can be interpreted as the consumer
willingness to pay for reduced future discounted costs. Expressing the results in this
form makes it easy and the interpretation is intuitive. However, these ratios can be
easily translated into a form that allows the values to be comparable to results reported
𝛾

elsewhere. We achieve this by dividing the ratio by
𝛼

1
𝑇
𝑠=0 1+𝑟

. Using data from

NHTSA vehicle survivability and travel mileage schedules (NHTSA 2006), we
assume the average vehicle has a useful life (T) of 15 years. To check sensitivity, we
try different values for T 10, 15, 20 and 25. Also, we assume discount rates ranging
from 5-9%. Most published work have used discount rates or either 6 or 7%. The
values in Column 3 are comparable to those reported by Alcott and Wozny (2009)
who used a discount rate of 6% for their base model.
In Figure 3, we plot the distribution of WTP to reduce future operating costs of
vehicles by households in our sample over different vehicle life times and interest
rates. The last two columns of Table 6 report our results. We estimate that for every
$1dollar saved in the future, consumers take no more than $0.99 into account. We find
evidence of small overvaluation and not one instance of undervaluation. These results
are in stark contrast to results reported by Helfand and Wolverton 2010; Greene 2010;
Alcott and Wozny 2009. We find that accounting for heterogeneity and sorting by
consumers, tends to remove any significant evidence of consumer undervaluation of
future fuel savings. The last two rows present lower 5% and upper 95% distribution of
consumer valuation of fuel economy. Though the lower 5% consumers only place
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values of $0.51 of a dollar savings, it does not signify energy paradox by this
population in the strict sense. This is because, there is a huge spread in the amount of
annual mileage by consumers across the population and this leads to huge valuation in
fuel economy. For example, if they drive a few standard deviations outside the mean,
they might choose the appropriate vehicle. The major take away from this is that
different drivers sort into different vehicles based on their taste and demographic
attributes. Those consumers who place higher values on fuel economy will sort into
more fuel efficient vehicles and those that place less value of future fuel savings sort
into large vehicles. Any demand estimation strategy that does not account for
heterogeneity in driving habits and taste preferences will probably arrive at the wrong
conclusion.
Conclusions
How consumers value fuel economy is one of the most researched questions in
to the automobile and energy sectors. The estimates are highly variable with some
papers concluding that consumers grossly undervalue fuel economy, while others have
reached the exact opposite situation. The high variability of the estimates signifies that
probably, heterogeneity in consumer might play a role in reconciling the different
results obtained. Despite the fact that individual unobservable heterogeneity and
sorting have been found in consumer vehicle choice and driving behavior, their effect
on estimates of consumer fuel economy valuation has not been presented empirically.
This paper presents such empirical evidence of the effect of individual unobserved
heterogeneity and sorting in the estimates of fuel economy valuation by consumers.
We demonstrate that sorting and unobserved heterogeneity has the potential to bias
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estimates of consumers‘ ability to optimally tradeoff capital and operating costs when
making durable choice decisions.
To restate our findings, we find no evidence to support the argument that
consumers systematically underweight the cost of future events in real market settings.
However, we find significant evidence that different consumers sort into different
groups such that rational consumers accurately tradeoff future operating costs and
vehicle prices. Conservatively, about 61% of the population is accurately do not
underweighting or overweighting operating costs when purchasing new vehicles. This
research has several limitations which provide a useful roadmap for future studies.
First, we do not include used vehicles in our model. There is no evidence that
consumers value new vehicles and old vehicles in a similar version or that different
consumers drive their vehicles over their useful life as developed in this paper. In fact,
evidence from textbook market exists that forward and myopic consumers place
different values on the resale price of durable goods. Ideally, the model could be
extended to allow for dynamic vehicle replacement as well creating a fully dynamic
framework. Second, the model developed in this paper makes strong assumptions
about the functional form of the distribution of consumers in the population for ease of
estimation. By restricting consumer taste parameters for price and operating costs to
be normally distributed, we are necessarily ruling out more flexible distributions of
consumer behavior which may be present in the population.
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Figure 2: Plot of Natural log of Real Gasoline Price and Forecasts
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Figure 3: Distribution of Willingness to Pay to Reduce Operating Costs
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Table 1: Description of Sample Households who Bought New Vehicles
Socioeconomic Characteristics
Variable

Sample Value

Average Household Income
Average Age
Average Household Size
Percentage Male
Percentage with Child 1-6
Percentage who live in large MSAs

$68,908
50
2.61
57
15
57

Large MSAs are described as being within MSAs with a population greater than 1 Million people.

Table 2: Summary Statistics of Sample Vehicle Characteristics
Automobile Characteristics
Mean Value
Variable
Standard Deviation
11,861
Annual Vehicle Miles Travelled (Miles)
17930
1.75
Real Gasoline Price ($/gallon)
0.51
$22,716
Vehicle Price
$10,006
192.1
Length (Inches)
16.5
112.9
Wheelbase (Inches)
11.4
194
52
HP (Pounds)
3479
695
Curb Weight (Pound)
Mpg
20.16
1.45
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Table 3: ARIMA (1,1,1) Model Annual US Retail Gas Price Data 1994-2005
Variable
Log of Real Gasoline Price
Constant
ARMA
AR1
MA1
Variance of Residuals (σ^2)
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Estimate

Standard Error

0.5208

0.126

0.8593
0.4671
0.0102

0.0691
0.1182
0.0074

Table 4: Parameter Estimates of Consumer Demand for Fuel Economy

Demand Side Parameters
Mean(β's)
Constant
Vehicle Cost/Income ($'000)-α
Operating Costs/Income-ϒ
Vehicle Size (Wheelbase * Length)
HP/Curb Weight (tons)
Curb Weight (tons)

No
Correction
(1)

Random
Coefficient-RC
(2)

RC with
Correction
(3)

-10.600
(0.360)
-0.76
(0.121)
0.165

-7.079
(0.918)
-2.13
(0.029)
-4.412

-8.093
(1.009)

(0.080)

(0.289)

(0.460)

3.46

2.63

2.89

(1.830)

(0.023)

(0.031)

-0.516

0.6

0.608

(0.020)

(0.042)

(0.063)

0.213

0.341

0.361

(-0.019)

(0.003)

(0.001)

0.54
(0.460)
4.05
(0.020)

1.08
(0.349)
5.866
(2.022)

2.066

2.085

(0.001)

(0.295)

2.08
1,470

1.84
1,470

Std. Deviations (σβ’s)
Vehicle Cost ($'000)
HP/Curb Weight (tons)
Operating costs
ϒ/α
# Observations

-0.22
1,470

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
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-3.58
(0.023)
-6.78

Table 5: Cost Side Parameter Estimates
Parameter Estimates

Standard Error

Constant
ln HP/Curb Weight (tons)

1.025
0.477

(0.194)
(0.003)

ln Curb Weight (tons)

1.03

(1.230)

In(MPG)

0.423

(0.029)

In(Size)

-0.048

(0.063)

Variables
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Table 6: Robustness of Consumer Valuation of Fuel Economy
(1)
T=10
1.540
1.620
1.770
1.690

Discount Rate=6%
Discount Rate=7%
Discount Rate=8%
Discount Rate=9%
Upper 95%
Lower 5%

Ratio ϒ/α=1.88
(2)
(3)
T=15
T=25
1.170
0.890
1.250
0.980
1.460
1.150
1.330
1.060
0.8-1.88
0.51

153

CONCLUSION
Policy makers have employed various policy instruments in an attempt to
achieve at least two policy goals. One goal is to reduce peak demand, obviating the
need for a large excess generating capacity which is rarely used. A second policy goal
is to reduce overall electricity consumption, thereby conserving fossil fuels and
reducing pollution. However, behavioral response interacts with these policies in a
complex manner sometimes resulting in unintended consequences. Therefore an
understanding of behavioral response is essential in designing effective energy
conservation policies.

This dissertation provides answers to several questions related to unanticipated
ways in which consumer behavior has affected the outcomes of energy policies. First,
I provide evidence from a field experiment on a demand response program that
investments in energy efficiency results in significant reduction of anticipated energy
consumption while at the same time reducing resultant emissions. Such reductions
offer utilities avenues for managing summer peak load without the necessity to build
costly peaking power plants. However, due to strategic behavior and income
substitution effects, households utilize these savings in different ways. I provide
evidence of direct rebound and precooling effects that an in the order of 41% of saved
energy, monetary and environmental benefits. While the DR program was designed to
create a flatter load shape for the utility to help reduce operating needs and complexity
during peak periods, the benefits of this program are in part offset by behavioral
response by consumers through precooling and rebound. That is the program results in
reducing peak load and emissions reduction, but not as much as one would predict
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because of behavioral response. This implies that behavioral response needs to be
taken into account if we are to have realistic forecasts of potential project outcomes. It
also implies that policies might be more effective if they are designed to create
incentives for behavioral response that are consistent with the goals of the policy, so
that behavioral response reinforces the program. This is really the notion of incentive
compatibility.
Second, due to the changes in consumers‘ consumption patterns that occur as
result of strategic behavior, utilities incur additional production costs which are then
passed through to consumers. The rebound and precooling results in an increase in
energy supply services, with a corresponding increase in effective prices, the size of
which depends on the underlying cost structure. Therefore utilities in response to
increased load during off-peak periods call more expensive generation units to meet
increased load. This results in an increase in the cost of conservation which may have
negative effect on the overall social welfare.

Third, one of the key barriers to achieving energy efficiency is the so-called
―energy paradox,‖ the idea that consumers undervalue cost savings from investments
in energy efficiency. The undervaluation of future fuel costs in the automobile market
is a great example for demonstrating such market failure. However, it has always been
challenging to accurately quantify the degree of the undervaluation, if it exists.
Consumer heterogeneity and sorting are important factors that must be considered in
order when quantifying the level of consumer undervaluation of investments in energy
efficiency. If consumers tend to undervalue long-term cost savings associated with
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efficient equipment, then this will reduce the effectiveness of some policies relative to
others (e.g., carbon tax versus gas guzzler tax). I find that accounting for sorting bias
and consumer heterogeneity explains a large fraction of the purported myopia found in
literature and conclude that myopic behavior may be a less significant problem; and
also that it may be confined to a subset of the population.

Fourth, CAFE standards are designed to improve gas mileage. However,
CAFE as structured is less stringent for larger vehicles therefore may be behind the
explosion in the demand for light duty trucks (SUVs, Minivans, Pickup-trucks, etc).
This explosion in the light truck share of the automobile fleet has introduced
―prisoner's dilemma‖ situation where drivers buy heavy vehicles for better selfprotection in collisions and increasing risks to occupants of other drivers. These
externalities have serious policy implications. In theory, an efficient fleet could be
achieved through a carefully calibrated tax based on careful cost-benefit analysis.
However, such a tax policy may pose practical problems of implementation in terms
of public acceptance and monitoring. A policy such as the proposed one will also lead
to the adoption of more fuel efficient vehicles over time and reduction in the weight of
the fleet.

Finally, estimates of emissions reduction impacts of energy conservation
programs show that they result in reducing emissions but as one might expect because
behavioral response will at least in part offset potential emission reductions from
efficiency-based policies. This suggests we can improve the performance policies by
integrating incentive-based programs such as carbon taxes or other tools policies that
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increase energy prices. This dissertation reviews these policies, and concludes that
while these policies do contribute to their major objectives, the benefits are at least in
part offset by unintended consequences due to behavioral response by consumers. The
main take away from this dissertation is that an understanding of behavioral response
is essential in designing effective policies.
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